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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines how Iran attempts to challenge the United States in the 
maritime domain. Iranian strategic thinking is discussed to better understand their views 
on self-reliance and national defense. The thesis then defines asymmetric naval warfare 
and how the strategy aims to counter perceived threats. Historical background is provided 
to understand how Iran’s naval force developed. The shift in Iran’s approach to the 
maritime domain, from conventional sea power to asymmetric naval warfare, is explained 
in reference to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Tanker War is used to demonstrate 
Iran’s first application of asymmetric warfare in the maritime domain. An examination of 
Iran’s current assets among its naval forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
Navy (IRGCN) and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Navy (IRIN), seeks to understand how 
Iran has evolved in the maritime domain. The IRGCN is examined in relation to its 
primary objective of Persian Gulf defense. The IRIN is examined in relation to its 
“blue-water” naval capability and use in cultivating partnerships. The research indicates 
Iran can credibly impact U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf and achieve security 
objectives within the maritime domain through the use of its current asymmetric naval 
threats. Iran’s naval forces reinforce the Islamic Republic’s ambitions for regional 
hegemony and provide an opportunity for future influence beyond the Persian Gulf. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has adamantly opposed Western influence and 
interference in regional affairs since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.1 Despite Iran’s 
disapproval, the United States continues to pursue its own political and economic interests 
in the Middle East. U.S. strategic objectives in the region are largely supported by the 
projection of military power in the maritime domain. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
partners provide the U.S. Navy access to ports, maintenance facilities, and supplies which 
assist U.S. operational sustainability. Iran views U.S. maritime presence and activities in 
the Persian Gulf, such as carrier strike group operations, as threats to national security. The 
steadfast commitment of U.S. Navy warships to the region has subsequently shaped how 
Iran approaches national defense. How does Iran attempt to challenge U.S. operations in 
the maritime domain? 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
With limited resources and military capability, Iran is unable to replicate U.S. 
conventional sea power. Out of necessity, Iran adopted asymmetric naval warfare to 
maximize defensive capabilities throughout the Persian Gulf and project a level of military 
strength across the Middle East. This strategic approach aims to deter U.S. naval operations 
and intimidate regional rivals. This thesis examines Iran’s unconventional approach to 
challenging the United States in the maritime domain. Does Iran have the required naval 
assets to achieve its strategic goals? Iran’s two maritime services, the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Navy 
(IRIN), are examined to identify each organization’s ability to meet national security 
requirements.2 The IRGCN is discussed in relation to its primary objective of Persian Gulf 
defense. The IRIN is discussed in relation to its limited blue-water naval capability and use 
in cultivating transactional relationships. An overall assessment is provided concerning the 
 
1 Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 132. 
2 Academic research occasionally refers to the IRGCN as Sepah Navy. The IRIN is a service branch of 
Iran’s traditional military force, the Artesh.  
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effectiveness of Iranian asymmetric naval warfare in deterring U.S. naval operations in the 
Persian Gulf. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Persian Gulf and the Global Economy 
The global economy, in part, relies upon a stable Persian Gulf that can safely export 
energy resources from the region.3 While armed conflict exclusively over the control of oil 
in the Middle East remains unlikely, the security of international shipping and oil 
transportation are separate and legitimate U.S. concerns.4 Regional tensions that lead to 
military conflict could restrict the movement of petroleum and cause significant shifts in 
the world’s price of oil. According to Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) data from 2018, 51.2% of the world’s proven oil reserves are in countries 
bordering the Persian Gulf.5 Additionally, Iran accounts for 33.9% of OPEC’s proven gas 
reserves.6 The Strait of Hormuz is the only sea passage available to maritime traffic for 
access to the Persian Gulf. Falling within Iranian and Omani territorial waters, the Strait of 
Hormuz stretches 22 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point and restricts the options 
shipping has for safe transit.7 Without the added possibility of military confrontation, high 
volume of traffic and limited maneuverability alone make transiting the Strait of Hormuz 
a demanding task. Iran claims the right to challenge military and commercial vessels 
transiting the Strait of Hormuz because it does not acknowledge the body of water as an 
international strait.8 This contention denies a vessel’s right to cite transit or innocent 
 
3 Jeff D. Colgan, “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War,” International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 
2013): 166–168. 
4 Emily Meierding, “Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth,” Security Studies 25, (May 2016): 283–284. 
5 “OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves, 2018,” Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, accessed November 7, 2020, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm. 
6 “Annual Statistical Bulletin 2020,” Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, accessed 
November 7, 2020, https://asb.opec.org/ASB_Charts.html?chapter=18. 
7 Kenneth Katzman, Nelesh Nerurkar, Ronald O’Rourke, R. Check Mason, and Michael Ratner, Iran’s 
Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, CRS Report No. R42335 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42335.pdf. 
8 Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare: Strategy and Capabilities in the 
Persian Gulf,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 164 (April 2020): 12. 
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passage through Iranian territorial waters. Massive tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz 
account for more than 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded oil every day.9 Iran’s 
geographic proximity grants their naval forces sufficient opportunity to interrupt the world 
trade of oil and create instability in the global market. 
A complete Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely due to the country’s 
own dependence on its use. Capital investment in infrastructure for Iran’s energy sector 
mostly comes from internal sources as international isolation limits access to foreign 
investors and external sources of revenue.10 Despite attempts to finance and construct 
alternative means to transport oil out of Iran, 90% of Iranian exported oil departs by sea 
from the Kharg terminals.11 Iran’s economy remains highly reliant on income from 
exported oil. Until new large-scale pipeline projects are completed, Iran has limited 
leverage on the threat of a complete Strait of Hormuz closure. More realistically, Iran could 
partially close shipping lanes or cause other annoyances to the steady flow of traffic in the 
region. Even then, Iran would remain cautious and calculated to prevent escalation of force. 
Provoking conventional naval forces into confrontation would impact Iran’s ability to 
maintain trade.12 Nevertheless, if Iran reached a point strategically where no other options 
were available, closure of the Strait of Hormuz would undoubtedly become an international 
concern. Safe passage through the region can be compromised by a variety of Iranian 
asymmetric naval threats. The industrialized world remains heavily dependent on oil from 
the Persian Gulf. Even a minor disruption could strain the global market. Iran’s contentious 
history with Western oil companies and the international community adds to their 
continued interest in shaping the future of the Middle East’s energy market.  
 
9 Nadimi, “Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare,” 4. 
10 Suzanne Maloney, Iran’s Political Economy Since the Revolution (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 422. 
11 Nadimi, “Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare,” 5. 
12 Abhijit Singh, “Dark Chill in the Persian Gulf – Iran’s Conventional and Unconventional Naval 
Forces,” Maritime Affairs 6, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 125–126. 
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2. U.S. Sphere of Influence 
The Persian Gulf remains of strategic interest to the United States and use of its 
international waters is key to the U.S. Navy projecting power throughout the wider Middle 
East. U.S. naval forces were deployed to the region as early as World War II but have 
maintained a consistent presence since the Tanker War in the late 1980s. An outgrowth of 
the Iran-Iraq War, the Tanker War threatened the security of tankers transporting oil out of 
the region. When Kuwait sought protection for their tankers, the United States seized an 
opportunity to resolve many of their own issues in the region. GCC partners were uncertain 
of U.S. commitment following the details behind the Iran-Contra affair going public. 
Assisting Kuwait allowed the United States to reassure allies and present itself as a 
stabilizing military force in an unpredictable part of the world. Simultaneously, occurring 
at the height of the Cold War, U.S. presence in the Middle East minimized Soviet influence 
in the region. Today, U.S. naval forces continue to protect this sphere of influence and 
confront what they perceive as Iranian expansionism in the Middle East.13 Iran’s complex 
partnerships with non-state actors and rivalries with Arab states concern the United States. 
The unpredictability of Iran’s relationships serves as potential sources of instability in the 
region.14 Furthermore, Iran seeks to undermine U.S. leadership of the global community 
and push the international system towards multipolarity. Reducing U.S. influence helps 
preserve Iranian sovereignty and ensures survival of the Islamic Republic.15 A disgruntled 
Iran forced to standby while a superpower’s navy operates near its territorial waters 
exacerbates rising tensions. 
 
13 David B. Crist, “Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea,” The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 95 (June 2009): 2–3. 
14 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 75. 
15 Frederic Wehrey, David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin, Jerrold D. Green, Dalia Dassa 
Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, and Jennifer Li, Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and 
Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), 14. 
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3. Iran as a Regional Naval Threat 
Iran portrays itself as a regional military power and prides itself as being a protector 
of the world’s energy market.16 Geography alone demands that Iran maintain a naval 
presence. With over 1,000 nautical miles of coastline, Iran has interest in shaping the 
maritime domain. Strategically important islands located inside the Strait of Hormuz 
reinforces Iran’s claim to controlling access to the Persian Gulf, provides convenient 
locations for military surveillance of naval traffic, and extends legal rights to mineral 
resources in the region.17 Inlets, coves, and offshore structures allow Iranian naval forces 
to stage equipment and weapons for extended patrols, mining operations, and swarming 
small boat attacks.18 The narrowness of the Persian Gulf also allows coastal cruise missiles 
to effectively target shipping lanes from a variety of potential sites.19 In comparison to 
other Middle Eastern navies, Iran holds an advantage in overall size and capability.20 The 
Iranian naval threat is one reason why GCC partners have largely delegated their maritime 
security dilemma to the U.S Navy. While the modernized U.S. naval fleet is technologically 
superior, Iranian naval forces present a unique challenge. Iran’s naval capability is viewed 
as a more serious threat to U.S. forces than Iran’s conventional ground forces.21 
Furthermore, of all Iran’s military organizations, the IRGCN has most effectively adopted 
asymmetric tactics.22 Left unbalanced, Iran could use the maritime domain to further 
expand their influence in the Middle East and more credibly threaten access to the Strait of 
Hormuz. 
 
16 Nadimi, “Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare,” 35. 
17 Christopher Harmer, “Iranian Naval and Maritime Strategy,” Institute for the Study of War, Middle 
East Security Report 12 (June 2013): 18. 
18 Nadimi, “Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare,” 32. 
19 Office of Naval Intelligence, “Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval 
Strategy,” (Fall 2009): 10. 
20 Joshua Himes, “Iran’s Two Navies: A Maturing Maritime Strategy,” Institute for the Study of War, 
Middle East Security Report 1, (October 2011): 17. 
21 Kemp and Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, 75. 
22 Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat, and Li, Dangerous But Not Omnipotent, 
67. 
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4. Gray Zone Conflict and Rising U.S.-Iran Tensions 
Gray zone conflict refers to an unspecified space between war and peace which 
coincides with opponents routinely challenging the political limits of their adversary. 
Revisionist powers and non-state actors use gray zone conflict to achieve small gains 
without facing the penalties of a war they would likely lose.23 Rising tensions between the 
United States and Iran, accelerated by President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, 
raises the level of uncertainty within gray zone conflict. Iran operates within the gray zone 
to challenge U.S. interests while managing the risk of conventional warfare. Within the 
maritime domain, IRGCN small boats interrupt or harass U.S. naval operations in the 
Persian Gulf. Their actions may not cross a legal justification for military response but do 
complicate decision-making processes within rapidly developing situations.24 To Iran’s 
advantage, these types of engagements could normalize close-quarter interactions and set 
favorable conditions for future IRGCN attacks. Iran can operate in the gray zone due to 
U.S. adherence to rigid definitions of war and peace. Western cultural and legal constraints 
allow states like Iran to operate with aggression, below the level of war, and face little to 
no repercussion. Iran temporarily backs down if its actions are met with swift and firm 
responses. However, a lack of response has tended to embolden further aggressive action.25 
Iranian attacks on U.S. allies are also difficult to respond to. Without a reaction, which 
demonstrates an unwillingness to defend an ally’s interests, the United States could damage 
relationships.26 The ambiguity of gray zone conflict gives advantages to Iran within the 
maritime domain, allowing them to present a challenge to U.S. conventional sea power 
with comparatively weaker assets. 
 
23 Scott H. Englund, “A Dangerous Middle-Ground: Terrorists, Counter-Terrorists, and Gray-Zone 
Conflict,” Global Affairs 5, no. 4–5 (December 2019): 397. 
24 Michael Eisenstadt, “Operating in the Gray Zone: Countering Iran’s Asymmetric Way of War,” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 162 (January 2020): 5. 
25 Eisenstadt, “Operating in the Gray Zone,” 13. 
26 Eisenstadt, “Operating in the Gray Zone,” 37. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. How Iran Views National Security 
The anti-Western rhetoric amplified throughout the Islamic Revolution grounded 
Iranian security planning in a profound suspicion of the international system. Episodes of 
foreign involvement in Iranian affairs, to include the U.S. orchestration of the 1953 coup 
d’état, inspired a movement to reclaim independence over the direction of internal 
affairs.27 Despite the significance of the Islamic Revolution on Iranian national security 
thinking, Tabatabai discusses how Iranian self-reliance is evident as early as the Qajar 
dynasty. Throughout Persian history the integrity of territorial borders and sovereignty 
were routinely challenged. Modern Iran has only further developed this yearning for self-
sufficiency and defense.28 Since 1979, the United States has predominantly viewed Iran’s 
national strategy in terms of exporting the Islamic Revolution. While Iran is undoubtedly 
doing so, their primary goals are deterrence and presenting a relentless defense. With 
political and economic turmoil persisting throughout the Middle East, Iran views itself as 
fighting for survival amongst a myriad of failed regimes, terrorism, and foreign 
interference. To challenge these threats Iran attempts to export the Islamic Revolution as 
one of many tools to safeguard unity within its own borders. In a world dominated by 
globalism, Iranian adamance on self-reliance is difficult to understand. However, the 
Islamic Republic believes that relying on internal mechanisms for defense is the only way 
to ensure survival. The regime does not want to be vulnerable to foreign pressure and 
threats. Distrust of the United States and insistence on self-reliance in strategic affairs has 
contributed to Iran’s regional and international isolation.29 To assure optimal defense with 
minimal foreign support, Iran has emphasized the development of domestic industrial and 
technological capabilities. This strategy aims to lessen the impact of economic sanctions 
and guarantee long-term national security. 
 
27 Ariane M. Tabatabai, No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National Security Strategy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2020), 298. 
28 Tabatabai, No Conquest, No Defeat, 299. 
29 Tabatabai, No Conquest, No Defeat, 300–302. 
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Self-sufficiency has driven Iran to focus on its domestic production of maritime 
assets. This strategy is further implemented as a necessary response to U.S. imposed 
sanctions. Iran’s military spending is impacted to some degree, however, sanctions are 
most effective at limiting Iran’s access to foreign technology. Even during times when 
sanctions are temporarily lifted, Iran is unable to acquire the more sophisticated platforms 
on the market. The self-reliance approach is a much slower way to develop military assets. 
It does, however, make it difficult for Iran’s adversaries to monitor infrastructure 
development and overall growth of their maritime capability.30 Iran routinely challenges 
commercial vessels and warships in a calculated manner to gauge the limits they can exert 
military strength. These tests aim to strain the United States and their allies’ commitment 
to objectives in the region. When successful, Iran’s national security strategy of self-
reliance is further validated. Repetition of Iran’s threats play into a long-term psychological 
warfare campaign against the United States. Iran envisions victory will come by outlasting 
the West, causing the United States to spend more resources and endure more casualties 
than what is politically feasible. Asymmetric warfare allows Iran to exploit these 
opportunities within the security realm, challenging great power at a feasible cost. 
2. Defining Asymmetric Warfare 
The defining characteristic of asymmetric warfare is the inherent difference 
between two belligerents. Academics began discussing asymmetric warfare as early as 
1975 in terms of the disparity in power between two forces.31 However, many of the tactics 
used in asymmetric warfare can be traced to Mao Tse-tung’s writings on insurgency and 
protracted war.32 As a modern concept, asymmetric warfare first made its appearance in 
U.S. military doctrine with 1995’s Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United 
States.33 Early definitions solely mentioned the inequality between forces but were 
 
30 Himes, “Iran’s Two Navies,” 24. 
31 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, (1975): 175–200. 
32 Mao Tse-tung, “On Protracted War,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, (Peking: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1967), 113–194. 
33 Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 19. 
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routinely expanded upon to include its political dynamics and unconventional tactics. One 
of the more thorough definitions of asymmetric warfare was written by Metz and Johnson. 
They define asymmetric warfare as:  
Acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to 
maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain 
the initiative or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, 
military-strategic, operational or a combination of these. It can entail 
different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives or 
some combination of these.34  
The goals of asymmetric warfare are deterrence-based and defensive, exploiting identified 
weaknesses in the enemy to increase the costs of war and diminish their political will to 
fight.35 In symmetrical conflict against the U.S. military, where a conventional force meets 
its mirrored opposite on the battlefield, there is little chance of victory for the opponent. 
Although Iran learned this lesson firsthand during the Tanker War, they were quickly 
reminded of U.S. advantages in symmetric warfare while observing Operation Desert 
Storm. Challenging the United States requires radically different strategies and tactics. 
Asymmetric warfare is most successful when exercised with patience. An 
immediate victory against a superior force is unlikely, therefore, military planning includes 
operations that will occur several years into the future. With its decisive power, the United 
States is accustomed to acting quickly against unmatched power. Protracted war is not 
politically acceptable among Western liberal democracies. Iran seeks to impose high costs 
to warfare. Drawing out military campaigns causes liberal democracies to lose the political 
will to pursue security objectives.36 Additionally, liberal democracies are expected to 
conduct themselves in a specific and restrained manner. Violence is avoided when possible 
and is expected to be targeted and proportional to the objective at hand. The weaker power, 
using asymmetric tactics, is not bound by the same constraints. Furthermore, the United 
States prefers to build coalitions to help legitimize military action. This not only delays 
 
34 Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson, “Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, 
Background, and Strategic Concepts,” Strategic Studies Institute, (January 2001): 5–6. 
35 Office of Naval Intelligence, “Iranian Naval Forces: A Tale of Two Navies,” (February 2017): 21. 
36 Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat, and  Li, Dangerous But Not Omnipotent, 
53. 
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decisive action against their adversary but allows the weaker state to take advantage of 
differences within the coalition’s relationships and possibly cause greater political 
unrest.37 This cultural impact on warfare allows the asymmetric threat a psychological 
advantage. By appearing “soft” the United States emboldens weaker states to push the lines 
of aggression when possible.38 
U.S. reservations about the use of force can paralyze military action and grant space 
for weaker powers, like Iran, to challenge the status quo.39 The perfect calculation of a 
military action’s effect is impossible to obtain. Iran’s authoritarian regime has flexibility 
to act when the United States appears skeptical about the use of force. The prevalence of a 
free press and the speed at which information can be relayed to the public can restrict U.S. 
application of force.40 States that care about their positioning within the international order 
will conform their behavior to agreed upon norms.41 Arrequin-Toft explains additional 
arguments for why some believe authoritarian regimes are better suited to fight wars than 
democratic regimes.42  Authoritarian regimes can mobilize resources more effectively than 
democracies because they are not required to respond to public opinion. Furthermore, 
authoritarian regimes are less likely to conform to the international laws of war, specifically 
those regarding noncombatants or civilians. Without considering the public’s view of a 
conflict, an authoritarian regime can sustain higher combat casualties without losing the 
military objective. In a democracy, combat casualties and loss of intermediate goals can 
significantly impact the political will of government leadership to continue military 
operations.43 Lastly, when comparing strong and weak actors in conflict, the stronger 
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power typically has a lower interest in the engagement. A stronger power’s survival is not 
at stake which implies a low interest and high political vulnerability. A weak actor’s 
survival is at stake which implies a high interest and low political vulnerability.44 In all, 
Iran is well-positioned in the sociopolitical environment of the modern world to leverage 
its inferior asymmetric naval threats within the maritime domain. Despite overwhelming 
material advantages, political considerations limit U.S. willingness to engage in conflict. 
Asymmetric tactics remain viable options due to the generational evolution of 
warfare. Hammes discusses this progression in warfare: first generation focusing on direct 
destruction of an enemy force, second generation relying on superior firepower, third 
generation removing an enemy’s ability to use command and control structures, and fourth 
generation eliminating the enemy’s political will to fight.45 Fourth generation warfare has 
proven successful against great powers. The political, economic, social, and military 
elements of fourth generation warfare depict an advanced form of insurgency. Since a 
fourth generation conflict can last decades, the weaker power will seek to meet 
intermediate objectives which slowly shift the opinion of target audiences.46 When 
Hammes published his book in 2004 he categorized Iran as a second or third generation 
warfare threat. However, following a reorganization of naval forces and areas of 
responsibility in 2007, Iran has further engrained their military strategy in asymmetry and 
a type of guerilla warfare at sea which is highly synonymous to insurgent tactics. Iran 
leverages its asymmetric naval threats to increase the costs and risks of U.S. Navy 
operations in the Persian Gulf. By submitting this challenge, Iran hopes to erode U.S. 
political will.  
3. Asymmetric Naval Warfare 
For most of naval history the trend was towards developing larger ships and 
weapons. Greater size allowed increased firepower and the ability to carry more personnel. 
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With the invention of the torpedo boat in the late nineteenth century, smaller vessels could 
inflict significant damage to larger surface vessels. Britain, with a vast surface fleet of 
battleships, was almost brought to economic collapse in World War I and II by German 
submarines disrupting supply lines. U.S. aircraft carriers are the cornerstone of 
contemporary naval power and have an unmatched ability to project strength at sea. 
However, these massive vessels were designed to operate away from the dangers of shore-
based threats. Additionally, as modern technology develops new sea-based threats, aircraft 
carriers have increasingly required the protection of other warships designed to counter 
those dangers. Today’s U.S. Navy operational requirements drag naval units closer into the 
littoral waters for which they were not designed to operate in.47 Asymmetric naval warfare 
allows weaker powers, unable to match the size and capability of modern warships, to 
utilize a myriad of other threats to counteract great power in the littorals. 
The naval element of asymmetric warfare capitalizes on being closer to shore which 
decreases an adversary’s response time to threats, lessens maneuverability of conventional 
warships, and makes a range of military options available. As vessels move towards the 
littorals, asymmetric forces can utilize shore-based missile sites and deploy cost-effective 
weapons to inflict damage against warships that cost hundreds of millions of dollars. While 
operating in the littorals, incoming missiles are difficult for an adversary to identify due to 
radar interference with land. This allows less time for targets to react and employ 
countermeasures. With additional stress placed on warships to react, the chance for 
miscalculation increases and errors can be made. A choice is forced, wait too long for 
confirmation of a hostile threat and risk an actual danger reaching the ship or act early with 
incomplete information. One key example of this occurred when Iran Air Flight 655 was 
shot down mistakenly by the USS Vincennes (CG 49) in 1988.48 The political impact of 
such a mistake can greatly discredit a stronger power’s actions. Alternatively, inaction 
could allow a weaker power to successfully complete an attack and damage the strong 
power’s military prestige. 
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Sea mines are another asymmetric threat which can cause substantial damage at 
low cost. Furthermore, a mine does not need to strike a target to produce a reaction. 
Knowledge of a mined area can prevent strong powers from navigating a particular region, 
greatly impeding their naval operations. Fourteen out of the seventeen U.S. Navy warships 
that were disabled or damaged because of enemy action since World War II were caused 
by mines.49 Mines are an extremely efficient way of providing layered defense of coastal 
waters. Stronger navies can be deterred from amphibious operations or other missions that 
require transiting the littorals.50 Minesweeping operations, depending on how quickly 
forces could be mobilized, could take several weeks to complete. Mine countermeasure 
vessels are typically unable to transit much faster than at a trawling speed, use a meticulous 
approach to clearing waters of mine threats, and require protection from other warships in 
the area. Technological advances continue to reduce the costs of mines, improve their 
resistance to environmental factors, and diversify their threat profile. Used during the 
Tanker War with success, Iran employs this aspect of asymmetric naval warfare to bolster 
their credibility of a Strait of Hormuz closure. 
Iran, understanding that spending resources on larger surface vessels would only 
provide easy targets for the U.S. Navy, invest widely in fast inshore attack craft (FIAC) to 
provide coastal naval defense. At their fast speeds, FIAC are difficult to detect on radar 
and target with defensive fire.51 Within the confusing environment of littorals, where other 
fishing or commercial vessels are likely to be underway, determining if a unit is a hostile 
FIAC can be challenging. These factors can allow FIAC to reach intended targets and 
employ their weapons before being detected.52 Using swarming maneuvers, FIAC can 
further add to the complexity of the littoral environment. Asymmetric naval warfare 
combines all factors previously discussed into a unified threat: difficult navigation in a 
littoral environment, shore-based missiles, mines, and FIAC. Together, these threats seek 
to overwhelm the modern U.S. Navy warship. Although conventional warships’ superior 
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technology can combat most threats, there remains a chance that one threat seeps through 
the defense and causes major damage. Willing to take losses to achieve victory, if a weaker 
power loses a handful of small boats in exchange for a successful strike on a great power’s 
warship they can claim success.53 Weaker powers can then use propaganda from a 
successful attack to humiliate stronger powers and cause them to question their 
commitment to protracted conflict.  
Due to a lack of resources, isolation from the international community, and inability 
to procure their own modern conventional naval threats through industry, Iran has fully 
invested in asymmetric naval warfare.54 Iran’s naval strategy relies on inflicting severe 
damage across several warships early in conflict. The goal is to drain their adversary’s 
political will to fight and cause their withdrawal from a military campaign. However, if 
unable to deter further aggression, Iran plans to continue asymmetric tactics to wage a 
protracted war, raising the costs and extending the time of conflict while continuing to 
combat the political will of their enemy.55 Their asymmetric naval threat seeks to 
maximize confusion and delay the U.S. Navy’s ability to make decisions. With thousands 
of vessels operating in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, Iran can essentially hide their 
FIAC among civilian vessels.56 Using speed, maneuverability, and stealth, IRGCN FIAC 
attempt to exploit the sluggishness of larger warships. While Iranian forces are willing to 
accept risk at the chance inflicting damage on a warship, it can also provoke emotional and 
overaggressive responses as seen during the Tanker War. Throughout the conflict, the 
United States repelled attacks from Iranian small boats as the units lacked coordination and 
attacked in manageable numbers. With lessons learned from past skirmishes with the U.S. 
Navy, strategically focused swarms may be capable of producing more favorable results. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis discusses how Iranian naval forces attempt to challenge the United 
States within the maritime domain and protect regional interests. Based on Iran’s adherence 
to self-reliance and asymmetric warfare, this thesis explains how Iran maximizes naval 
capabilities given their economic restraints. After reviewing both Iranian maritime 
services, an assessment is made as to how effectively the state is realizing goals within the 
maritime domain. Iranian naval history is provided for context and an understanding of 
how Iran’s naval capabilities evolved over time. Capabilities and limitations of Iran’s 
current naval assets are defined to determine how its units can realistically achieve security 
objectives. Strategy and tactics are considered to demonstrate how these asymmetric naval 
threats are leveraged for maximum value. IRIN deployments are discussed to demonstrate 
Iran’s willingness to slightly deviate from self-reliance and utilize transactional 
relationships with Russia and China to advance security goals. Additionally, case studies 
of IRGCN interactions at sea are analyzed to compare stated strategic goals with actions 
taken. The Farsi Island incident (January 12, 2016) is reviewed to indicate Iran’s hesitancy 
to escalate situations with the U.S. military. Iran’s seizure of British vessel Stena Impero 
is detailed to reveal how the IRGCN asserts its naval presence against commercial traffic 
in the Persian Gulf. Three main hypotheses were developed as part of the preliminary 
research. 
(1) First Hypothesis 
Iran has developed its naval forces in response to past failures during the Tanker 
War. Their asymmetric naval threat provides a suitable level of deterrence and defense in 
the region. A sufficient challenge is posed to U.S. Navy conventional forces. 
(2) Second Hypothesis 
Despite Iran’s modest improvements in asymmetric naval warfare since the Tanker 
War, they remain unable to present a legitimate challenge to the United States within the 
maritime domain. Their threat is easily countered through conventional sea power and 
inhibits Iran’s ability to secure national defense. 
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(3) Third Hypothesis 
Without comparable conventional naval forces and weaponry, Iran will never meet 
its security objectives within the maritime domain. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
After detailing Iran’s naval history and explaining how the state came to adopt 
asymmetric naval warfare, this thesis analyzes IRGCN and IRIN capabilities and 
limitations in presenting challenges to the United States within the maritime domain. 
Strategies and tactics of Iran’s naval forces are studied to measure effectiveness in 
achieving national security objectives. Case studies of recent IRGCN interactions at sea 
are discussed to provide further insight into Iranian maritime strategic thinking. 
Interactions were chosen based on the clear strategic choices that accompanied each 
situation. In each case study, Iran had opportunity to escalate aggression but made specific 
choices throughout each incident to monitor the level of reaction from Western powers. 
Research for this thesis included relevant secondary and primary sources. Numbers 
of Iranian vessels and weaponry, especially within the IRGCN, may not accurately reflect 
true figures. Iran’s tendency to inflate military power is considered when analyzing naval 
capabilities and limitations. Precise figures of small boats and other weapons are difficult 
to obtain due to Iran’s ability to keep assets hidden in a variety of coves and inlets. 
However, secondary works that discuss capabilities and limitations are used to provide a 
broad overview. Secondary sources include government reports and scholarly articles 
about relevant topics. Primary sources are used to link capabilities with stated strategic 
objectives. News reports from Western and Iranian media, as well as statements from 
military officials, are used for analysis. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains five chapters. The first chapter introduced the topic and 
provided the foundation for Iran’s asymmetric approach to national security. The second 
chapter provides historical background of Iran’s naval forces. Iran’s transition from 
conventional sea power to asymmetric naval warfare following the Islamic Revolution is 
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discussed. Chapter three provides a broad overview of Iran’s capabilities and limitations 
within the maritime domain. The IRGCN and IRIN are analyzed in reference to their 
organization’s stated maritime missions. Chapter four explains how Iran’s naval assets 
implement specific strategies and tactics to achieve desired effects within the maritime 
domain. Finally, chapter five summarizes the overall findings of the thesis and provides an 
assessment of Iran’s challenge to the United States within the maritime domain. 
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II. IRANIAN NAVAL HISTORY 
Iran’s strategic approach to the maritime domain has not always centered around 
asymmetric naval warfare. Prior to the Islamic Revolution, Iran acquired a conventional 
naval force capable of achieving coastal defense and pursuing blue-water interests. With 
the support of Western partners, Iran may have developed a naval strategy aimed at sea 
control rather than implementing asymmetric strategies which seek sea denial. However, 
the political upheaval surrounding the Islamic Revolution contributed to Iran’s 
international isolation and economic decline. Modern warships with advanced weapons 
systems became unattainable and Iran was forced to employ unconventional strategies to 
maintain some level of influence in the Persian Gulf. This chapter will examine key 
historical events that impacted Iran’s strategic approach to the maritime domain and 
explain why Iran currently relies upon asymmetric naval warfare to challenge adversaries. 
First, the development of the Iranian Imperial Navy (IIN) under the last Shah of Iran is 
visited. Second, the origins of the IRGCN are discussed in the context of the Islamic 
Revolution and Iran-Iraq War. Next, the Tanker War is examined to detail Iran’s first 
extensive use of asymmetric naval warfare. This section will also review Iran’s inability to 
coordinate asymmetric naval threats during Operation Praying Mantis. While Iran 
maintains ambitions for regional hegemony, they are unable to pursue goals with 
conventional military strategies. Within the maritime domain, political and economic 
restraints curtail Iran’s ability to build or acquire modern warships. Instead, Iran uses 
asymmetric naval warfare out of necessity and a lack of alternative options. 
A. SHAH’S IMPERIAL NAVY 
Following World War II, Iran displayed an increased interest in the maritime 
domain through expansion of the IIN. However, development of a modern Iranian naval 
force was heavily dependent upon the precarious relationship Iran had with the West. Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, monarchical ruler of Iran from 1925 to 1941, sought to abstain from 
involvement in international politics and remain neutral throughout World War II. Despite 
his position, an Allied invasion and occupation of Iran as part of Operation Countenance 
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unwillingly drew Reza Shah into the conflict. In the process of Allied forces solidifying 
supply lines through the Persian Corridor to the Soviet Union, the existing Iranian naval 
fleet was decimated.57 After the Allies’ occupation, Reza Shah’s persistent refusal to abide 
by British demands resulted in the forceful abdication of his power. His son, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, held favor with the British and was permitted to succeed as Shah of Iran. 
Left with no significant military establishment in place, Mohammad Reza was determined 
to rebuild Iran’s armed forces and transform the country into a regional power.  
Under Mohammad Reza’s rule, an improving relationship with the West allowed 
the Shah to replace the annihilated Iranian naval fleet with U.S. and British designed small 
surface combatants. In the early 1960s, the IIN fleet consisted of four Cape-class patrol 
craft and five small minesweepers. Iran expanded its coastal fleet in 1964 by acquiring two 
PF 103-class corvettes from the United States; an additional two were purchased in 1970. 
These corvettes were the first IIN vessels capable of conducting operations in open oceans 
beyond the Persian Gulf. By 1966 the IIN acquired, from the Royal Navy, a Battle-class 
destroyer, three improved PGM 71-class patrol crafts, and four Vosper Thornycroft Mark 
V frigates.58 This strategic emphasis on the maritime domain also oversaw a rise in IIN 
manpower, with personnel increasing from 1,000 to 6,000 by 1965.59 Despite the IIN’s 
growth and increased military capacity, Britain’s extensive defensive commitments across 
the Persian Gulf prevented any other nation from exercising influence within the maritime 
domain. British military presence in the region did not diminish until Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson announced his intentions to initiate a steady withdrawal from the region in 
January 1968. Wilson’s goal was to have all British forces in the Persian Gulf removed by 
December 1971.60 The announcement of British withdrawal from the region emboldened 
the Shah to convey his own ambitions of Iran becoming the new symbol of security in the 
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Middle East. In April 1969, the Shah abrogated a 1937 treaty with Iraq delineating 
navigational rights along the Shatt al-Arab and directed his newly acquired warships to sail 
near the waterway in a show of force.61 The Shah was positioning Iran to fill a power 
vacuum that would be left by the departing British forces. 
Rising defense costs and decreasing control over the internal affairs of Persian Gulf 
states contributed to Britain’s decision to leave the region.62 However, Britain was aware 
that their absence could threaten Persian Gulf stability. Invigorated opposition could 
challenge established regimes in the Middle East, the Soviet Union could fill a void left by 
Britain’s departure, and regional conflict could erupt around ethnic differences or territorial 
disputes.63 In reference to Iran, the latter would occur as the Shah forcefully asserted 
claims to strategic islands in the region. Iran promptly declared legal ownership of Abu 
Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Simultaneously, Iran positioned military forces on 
the islands and established the positions as forward operating bases capable of protecting 
sea lines of communication through the Strait of Hormuz.64 The Shah remained actively 
engaged with progress on naval training, military base upgrades, and the general expansion 
of Persian Gulf capabilities. His goal was to limit the influence of foreign navies in the 
region and make Iran the exclusive guarantor of safe international shipping.65 Claiming 
strategic positions near the Strait of Hormuz granted Iran significant advantages in 
surveillance, intelligence gathering, and response times to maritime traffic entering or 
exiting the Persian Gulf. 
Despite the continuing drawdown of British assets in the region, aggressive Iranian 
claims to territories caused Britain to consider a response. Although unwilling to continue 
substantial levels of involvement and investment in the Middle East, Britain maintained 
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political and economic interests in the Persian Gulf. Arab regimes were disappointed with 
the British decision to remove their stabilizing military force from the region. They viewed 
the British departure as contributing to Iran’s progress towards regional hegemony. The 
Shah remained confident in his political moves, especially with a favorable U.S.-Iran 
relationship developing. The Shah’s reputation within the international community was 
strong enough to dissuade any regional coalition from legitimately posing a threat to Iran.66 
Britain ultimately determined that placing too much pressure against Iran’s claims could 
incite an unconventional response of which Britain was unprepared to handle.67 Rather 
than risk an escalation of tensions with Iran and possible embarrassment in a military 
engagement, Britain allowed Iran’s moves to go unopposed. The Shah’s decision to pursue 
Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb ended successfully and granted him additional 
leverage within the maritime domain.   
The Shah continued to strengthen relationships with the West throughout most of 
the 1970s, granting Iran access to the world’s most advanced defense industries. The 
United States viewed Iran as an emerging regional power and an important partner well-
positioned against the spread of communism. This allowed the Shah to receive financial 
aid and coordinate arms deals with the West. These favorable terms also provided the Shah 
with resources needed to reinforce his position against competing domestic factions within 
Iran.68 Specifically within the maritime domain, Iran was well on its way to becoming the 
Middle East’s exclusive conventional naval force. Between 1966 and 1978, the Shah 
acquired two U.S. Sumner-class destroyers, 12 French La Combattante-class patrol boats, 
12 hovercrafts, and a large fleet of U.S. naval helicopters.69 In 1974, the United Kingdom 
delivered two Hengam-class landing ships; an additional two were placed on order. In 
1980, Japan delivered five ro-ro ships which were procured for the IIN’s amphibious and 
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minelaying capabilities.70 IIN manpower continued to increase to 28,000 personnel by 
1978, making the IIN the largest navy among Persian Gulf nations.71 For naval warfare 
training, Iranian officers were welcomed to study at military institutions in the United 
States and across Europe. Beyond these acquisitions, the United States agreed, in principle, 
to sell Iran four Spruance-class destroyers, three Tang-class diesel submarines, six Type-
209 class submarines and 12 F-122 class missile frigates.72 Among European partners, Iran 
had plans to acquire 12 Kortenaer-type frigates and six 209/1400 diesel electric submarines 
from Dutch and German shipyards.73 The Islamic Revolution would bring all these 
prospective military acquisitions from the West to a sudden halt. 
Prior to the Islamic Revolution, Iran was nearing an ideal position to exert influence 
within the maritime domain. Local defense of the Persian Gulf could be achieved through 
superior conventional sea power which would also have the means to pursue other blue-
water interests across the Indian Ocean. However, the Islamic Revolution would overthrow 
the Shah’s leadership and install a theocratic regime. The new government severed ties 
with the West and abandoned any ability Iran had to acquire or maintain conventional 
military strength.74 Lacking the domestic defense industry necessary to foster its own 
development, Iran’s naval build-up was only sustainable through extensive foreign support. 
Asset procurement, fleet maintenance, and training was impossible without an intact 
relationship with the United States. Prior to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the IIN had 
11 major warships (destroyers, frigates, and corvettes) and 19 smaller vessels (fast attack 
and patrol craft).75 The newest IIN warships with advanced weapons systems were 
essentially made obsolete with the withdrawal of Western technical support. 
The reliance on outside entities also prevented the IIN from cultivating its own 
organizational practices. The IIN’s managerial inefficiencies and general lack of 
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preparedness to carry out major combat missions became readily apparent when the Islamic 
Republic ended relations with the West. New leadership viewed the IIN’s use of foreign 
military concepts and doctrines as dictating the development of Iranian national security 
strategy.76 Rather than continue to borrow from the West, the Islamic Republic returned 
to a strategy centered around self-sufficiency. Strict adherence to self-reliance meant that 
a modern naval force was unmanageable. The technology to equip warships and 
infrastructure necessary to conduct routine maintenance were both unavailable to Iran. 
Furthermore, economic costs associated with international isolation significantly limited 
the capacity for future research and development. Providing national defense 
independently would force Iran to entertain alternative methods, including the use of 
asymmetric naval warfare. 
B. IRGCN’S ORIGINS 
Mohammad Reza fled Iran on January 16, 1979 in response to the rising popularity 
of the Islamic Revolution.77 After five decades of Pahlavi dynastic rule, Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini established his theocratic regime and assumed ultimate authority over 
Iran’s military forces. However, the abrupt change of power and ongoing revolutionary 
sentiment across the country led Khomeini to be weary of trusting the standing military 
leadership. To protect Khomeini’s position and attempt to unite the numerous grassroot 
movements that had developed throughout the revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps (IRGC) was officially created on April 22, 1979.78 Parallel security forces 
allow newly installed regimes to counteract the power and influence of a regular armed 
military.79 The two main camps within the Islamic Revolution, Islamists and nationalists, 
agreed that a parallel security force was necessary to protect Khomeini from coup attempts 
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and loyalist movements among the Shah’s remaining supporters. Military leadership 
needed to be vetted for allegiance to the Islamic Republic’s ideals. However, disagreement 
among the factions centered around which group would exercise control over the IRGC. 
Using personal ties to Khomeini, Islamists gained immediate authority over the IRGC but 
heavily relied upon nationalist controlled government institutions for financing.80 Over 
time, Khomeini cleverly fused Islamist religious ideology and nationalist Iranian identity 
to subdue factional infighting and ensure the Islamic Republic’s stable hold on power. 
Khomeini used the IRGC as a personal tool to limit his opposition’s ability to 
challenge the regime’s authority and to consolidate power within the new Islamic 
Republic.81 By labelling his opponents’ actions as unjust, Khomeini legitimized the 
IRGC’s use of intense force to crush dissent. This included authorizing the murders of 
senior leadership throughout the traditional military force. Eliminating top-ranking Iranian 
military officials meant, specifically for the navy, that experienced managers, 
knowledgeable instructors, and trained maintenance teams were unavailable to support the 
high-tech weapons systems purchased from the West.82 Despite Iranian naval officers 
being more supportive of revolutionary ideals when compared to the leadership of other 
military branches, the navy’s defense spending was cut by one-third and approximately 
5,000 sailors deserted the force.83 Upon convincing clerical leadership to endorse IRGC 
actions and attract popular support for the security force, Khomeini transformed the early 
revolutionary undertones of the organization into a durable military force. The IRGC 
expanded its reach outside of its security activities to include intelligence gathering and 
economic development. This growing influence quickly made the IRGC a social and 
cultural force within the Islamic Republic.84 Popular support for the IRGC was tied to the 
organization’s adherence to revolutionary ideology that challenged Western imperialism 
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across the Middle East.85 Decades of foreign involvement in the region fueled many of the 
protests during the revolution and these sentiments were widely shared throughout IRGC 
leadership. The IRGC’s military capability, resolve, and staying power would be tested, 
however, during the Iran-Iraq War. 
The IRGC established itself as a legitimate military force early into the conflict 
with Iraq. Although an overall lack of training and experience hindered the organization, 
aggressive human wave tactics and persuasive leadership allowed the IRGC to become a 
strategic component of the war effort.86 At the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the traditional 
military still outpaced the IRGC in funding and equipment. Despite the logistical disparity 
between the forces, the devotion of IRGC soldiers to Islamic Republic ideals propelled the 
organization’s status. The purge of traditional army soldiers throughout the revolution 
resulted in the force being left with around one-third of its manpower.87 The IRGC was 
ready to take advantage of the opportunity and were critical to repelling Iraqi advances 
throughout the war as a supplemental force. The prolonged nature of the Iran-Iraq War was 
capitalized on by IRGC leadership to consolidate Khomeini’s power back home.88 With 
the traditional army deployed along the western front lines and occupied with invading 
Iraqi forces, opportunities to challenge the Islamic Republic’s regime diminished. 
Due to the limited military capabilities of the IRGC in its infancy, leadership 
continued to rely upon the devotion of their ranks as their point of strength. By 
indoctrinating them with an ideology centered around religion, the revolution, and 
Khomeini, IRGC soldiers were willing to take extreme measures for the preservation of 
the Islamic Republic.89 While the regime undoubtedly strove for clear victory in the Iran-
Iraq War, the definition of success was messaged differently among the IRGC ranks. 
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Sacrifice and suffering for the benefit of the Islamic Republic were conveyed as the rewards 
of war themselves, regardless of the outcome.90 IRGC soldiers were expected to 
understand that the lasting goals of the revolution warranted their steadfast resolve, even 
in the face of unfavorable odds. As the Iran-Iraq War continued and the IRGC’s role 
expanded, the organization was granted a larger portion of the Islamic Republic’s 
resources. With the IRGC offering better pay, social status, and job opportunities after time 
of service, recruitment among young men increased.91 Even with the war seemingly in a 
stalemate, the IRGC was growing in military capability, political reliability, and economic 
influence. 
The rise of the IRGC and its evolution from a small-scale regime security service 
into a central military force is paralleled by the IRGCN’s own growth.92 As the United 
States became more invested in the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War, their intelligence 
community noticed Iran’s credible threat against oil shipping as early as March 1984.93 
Despite U.S. military presence already in the Persian Gulf, Iranian asymmetric naval 
warfare and the threat of kamikaze tactics by small boats armed with explosives led the 
United States to deploy warships in larger numbers. The IRGC began to utilize the 
maritime domain in 1984 during amphibious offensives in southern Iraq. Marshland boats 
were used to transport soldiers and supplies in a timelier fashion as the land war began to 
stall out.94 The expanding use of the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War led to the 
IRGCN being officially established in September 1985 as an independent maritime service. 
In February 1986, the IRGCN played a critical role in the seizure of Iraq’s al-Faw 
Peninsula. Using the Shatt al-Arab waterway, IRGCN small boats transported troops and 
supplies to aid in the war effort.95 During their first full year of service, IRGCN operations 
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would exclusively entail other support roles. In September 1986, the IRGCN began to take 
part in combat operations throughout the Persian Gulf.96 In their first operation, the 
IRGCN temporarily seized an abandoned Iraqi offshore oil terminal that was used as an 
intelligence gathering outpost at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab.97 The success of the 
IRGCN operation gave the organization confidence in their ability to widely enact naval 
swarming operations and led to an increased investment in IRGCN naval capabilities. 
IRGCN officers and sailors were revolutionary conscripts dedicated to the Islamic 
Republic’s cause but lacked proper naval training.98 Religious zeal was depended upon to 
make up for their inexperience. Islamic Republic leadership relied on the aggressive 
passion of IRGCN sailors to deny culpability with the organization’s earliest operations 
and avoid repercussions from the United States. By 1987, the IRGCN had approximately 
20,000 sailors operating from two main naval bases (Abu Musa and Farsi Island).99 The 
bulk of IRGCN assets came from a converted order of 45 Swedish-built, Boghammer 
Marin Company speedboats. Around 42 feet in length, these aluminum framed small boats 
could sustain speeds of 40 knots and sprint at 60 knots for short periods.100 Boghammers, 
lightly armed with machine guns and rocket launchers, operated in patrols of three or four 
units and slowly began to see more operational use.101 The IRGCN quickly became aware 
of the vulnerability small boats had in suboptimal sea conditions. One of the IRGCN’s 
most notable swarming attacks against Saudi Arabia’s Khafji oilfields on October 3, 1987 
resulted in the IRGCN flotilla being stranded at sea once the command boat lost its way.102 
Even with deficiencies in communications and naval maneuvering, the low cost, high 
speed, and ease of use of IRGCN small boats caused the assets to remain a necessary part 
of Iranian maritime strategy. The IRGCN steadily increased attacks on carefully identified 
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oil tankers and platforms that presented easy targets. Moving forward, any attempt by Iran 
to challenge enemy forces within the maritime domain would be conducted with some 
combination of asymmetric naval threats. 
C. TANKER WAR 
An outgrowth of the Iran-Iraq War, the Tanker War was the maritime component 
to a conflict that was otherwise dominated by land and air warfare. The general military 
objective, from both Iran and Iraq, was to disrupt the shipment of oil and military supplies 
to the adversary, thereby, breaking the conflict’s stalemate occurring on land.103 Similar 
to how the Iran-Iraq War left a lasting imprint on the strategic development of Iranian 
ground forces, the Tanker War shaped Iranian naval warfare. What began in 1984 as low-
scale tit-for-tat strikes on oil platforms and shipping, ended with direct involvement of U.S. 
conventional sea power. Over the course of the Tanker War, a total of 411 ships came under 
attack by land, sea, air, or mines.104 Iran alone attacked 190 ships from 31 countries and 
drew the U.S. Navy into its largest surface battle since World War II.105 Although the scale 
of naval warfare was vastly different between the Tanker War skirmishes and World War 
II battles, this demonstrates how Persian Gulf stability depended upon U.S. naval 
intervention and involvement in the region. Despite Iran’s decisive loss in the Tanker War, 
asymmetric naval warfare persists as Iran’s only viable means to provide coastal defense. 
Without the ability to obtain a large conventional naval force, Iran has no choice other than 
to improve upon the strategic failures observed during its last major surface engagement. 
Lacking a navy capable of conducting operations in the Persian Gulf, Iraq’s 
involvement in the Tanker War was predominantly from the air. Although Iraq proclaimed 
waters near the Iranian northern coast a prohibited war zone, they were unprepared to 
enforce such declarations by sea. Using the French-made Exocet air-to-surface missile, 
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Iraq threatened Iranian shipping in an extension of their air campaign.106 Iraq’s reduced 
ability to distinguish Iranian vessels from foreigners in the air slowed their execution of 
military operations.107 A misstep could turn the international community against Saddam 
Hussein, therefore, Iraq remained cautious in their strikes. Iran, on the other hand, used 
naval surface combatants as their primary means of attacking shipping by the end of 1986. 
Even with operational setbacks caused by the tumultuous Islamic Revolution, Iran 
maintained the largest navy of Persian Gulf states. Beginning in early 1987, hit-and-run 
operations from swarming vessels occurred more frequently and were typically unopposed. 
Iran was effective in implementing a blockade on Iraqi ports and identifying merchant 
vessel targets.108 Iran’s major weapon threat was the Chinese-made Silkworm anti-ship 
cruise missile (ASM), which was three times larger than the Exocet missile. All shipping 
within the Strait of Hormuz was within Iran’s range and vulnerable to missile attacks in an 
area labeled the Silkworm Envelope.109 An additional asymmetric naval threat of sea 
mines deployed in the major shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf escalated operational risk 
in the region. Already concerned with the potential political and economic consequences 
of an expanding maritime conflict, the U.S. Navy entered the Tanker War in a much larger 
capacity by mid-1987. 
Iran’s decision to attack the Iraqi economy and war effort through the maritime 
domain came with risk. Outside of attacking oil pipelines in Turkey by land, Iran was left 
with two maritime options: attack neutral ships bound for Kuwaiti ports or indirectly attack 
Iraq by striking tankers from countries supportive of Saddam Hussein.110 Iran proceeded 
with the latter option in a calculated manner to avoid confrontation with the United States. 
While the United States seemed willing to actively defend shipping in the Persian Gulf, 
Iran was confident the United States had no plans to conduct offensive attacks on Iranian 
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territory. To prevent war with the United States, Iran chose to strike large, slow-moving 
crude oil tankers rather than warships. Iranian missile attacks on stationary targets, such as 
Kuwaiti oil facilities and anchored vessels, demonstrated their commitment to this 
strategy.111 As Iranian operations in the Tanker War expanded, Iran would slowly draw 
more foreign naval forces into the Persian Gulf. As the effects of the war impacted more 
countries, allied naval forces became critical in forcing Iranian leadership to reconsider 
their anti-shipping operations.112 If Iran was unable to achieve victory in the maritime 
domain, they would be forced to abandon their campaign on land as well. 
The United States was drawn into the regional conflict through the attack on the 
USS Stark, Kuwaiti’s call for protection of tankers, and the lingering threat of Soviet 
influence making its way into the Middle East. The Stark was struck by two Exocet missiles 
from Iraqi aircraft while conducting routine operations in the Persian Gulf on May 17, 
1987.113 As news of the attack returned to the United States, it became apparent that the 
value placed on American sailors and national reputation would force a U.S. military 
response. Rather than blame Iraq for the attack on Stark, Iran was accused of creating the 
confusing environment which caused the incident. A request from Kuwait for the United 
States to provide naval escorts for oil tankers was accepted and preparations were expedited 
in wake of the Stark incident.114 The United States could respond to the loss of American 
sailors and provide a stabilizing force in the Tanker War. While Kuwait was genuinely 
interested in the immediate protection of its ships, the larger goal was to end the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq. Kuwait was actively requesting assistance from both the United 
States and Soviet Union to involve a superpower in the Persian Gulf.115 Ending the Tanker 
War would normalize maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf and return economic stability to 
a region that depended upon the free flow of goods through the Strait of Hormuz.  
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Operation Earnest Will, the name given to the American re-flagging and protection 
of Kuwaiti tankers operation, provoked an Iranian response to include mining operations 
within Persian Gulf shipping lanes where convoys would transit. The Bridgeton was the 
first tanker casualty under U.S. escort to withstand a mine strike. With 1–1/8 inch thick 
plating, compared to the 5/8 inch plating on U.S. Navy warships, the mine blast did not 
place the Bridgeton out of service. However, if one of the three escorting warships would 
have struck the mine, the combination of densely packed fuel and explosive ordnance 
onboard could have been detrimental. The Bridgeton sustaining only moderate damage did 
not prevent Iranian celebration. The Islamic Republic presented this as a major victory for 
Iran and a massive humiliation for the United States which had expended enormous 
resources in preparing for Operation Earnest Will. The United States, now aware of the 
danger mines presented to warships, used the Bridgeton as a deep draft minesweeper for 
the remainder of the transit. The Bridgeton plowed the way forward while U.S. warships 
fell in behind the tanker’s wake. Televised images of the warships seeming to cower 
damaged U.S. military prestige and exposed vulnerabilities within the U.S. Navy. 
Silkworm missiles and swarming small boats were of a greater concern and occupied the 
minds of U.S. Navy leadership prior to their increased commitment to the region. The mine 
threat was almost an afterthought and the failure to anticipate such tactics triggered intense 
criticism. Iran was depending on the Bridgeton incident to challenge U.S. commitment in 
the Persian Gulf. Iran had observed the United States leaving their war in Vietnam and 
reflected on U.S. inaction in the aftermath of the Shah’s removal during the Islamic 
Revolution.116 The asymmetric naval threat of mines would be further used to test U.S. 
political will. 
Emboldened by their small victory, Iran continued its tactics and use of media to 
continue eroding the confidence of their adversary. Two more vessels would strike mines, 
the Texaco Caribbean and the Anita, causing the United States to plea for help from 
European allies for minesweeper support.117 The lack of minesweepers available from the 
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U.S. Navy became a glaring hole in their ability to combat the Iranian threat. It was not 
until the United States caught the Iran Ajr in the act of laying mines that the United States 
would win over the international community for additional assistance in the Persian 
Gulf.118 Although Iranian mining operations came to a halt, they did take advantage of the 
Sea Isle City underway without escort. Iranians attacked the vessel with a Silkworm missile 
and made their strategy clear. Iran would avoid direct confrontation with the United States 
and only strike in ways where it was difficult for the United States to warrant a clear 
response.119 While the United States and Iran had not erupted into open conflict, the 
potential for lower-level military action continued to rise. In response to the growing threat, 
the United States mobilized equipment and resources in the region to erect Mobile Sea 
Bases (floating military barges) which could stage small boats and helicopters.120 These 
bases were typically positioned around twenty miles from Farsi Island, providing 
surveillance and a more rapid response to Iranian aggression against escort operations. 
After an extended period without the threat of Iranian mines it seemed that the tactic 
was abandoned. However, when the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) struck a mine it 
became evident that the threat was still real. The mine caused significant damage, 
astounding many experts as to how the crew saved the ship from sinking. Captain Rinn, 
commanding officer of Samuel B. Roberts, was in routine communication with U.S. Navy 
leadership and was questioned multiple times as to when he planned on abandoning ship. 
The plans were unnecessary as damage control efforts by sailors throughout the night saved 
the ship as it made its way back towards Bahrain. In the end, Samuel B. Roberts’ repairs 
would take 18 months, amounting to $96 million. The Iranian mine causing the extensive 
damage likely cost no more than $1,500.121 In response to the Samuel B. Roberts mine 
strike, the United States began planning retaliatory strikes. The resulting operation would 
demonstrate Iran’s willingness to challenge the United States in the maritime domain. 
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D. OPERATION PRAYING MANTIS  
U.S. response to the Samuel B. Roberts’ mine strike was carefully planned. While 
the United States intended to send Iran a message that attacks on U.S. warships would not 
go unanswered, the U.S. political climate was not conducive to escalating tensions in the 
Middle East. Strikes on Iran’s mainland or islands were out of the question as they would 
be perceived as a direct siding with Iraq in the overarching conflict. Additionally, the 
United States wanted to keep the military response proportional to guarantee smooth 
execution and reduce the opportunities for failure. Iran damaging a single unit or 
highlighting any shortcoming of the U.S. operation could end up being an Iranian 
propaganda victory.122 Therefore, U.S. plans for Operation Praying Mantis centered 
around Iranian assets that were critical to their Tanker War campaign. Targets were 
selected that would greatly diminish Iran’s ability to persist in attacking civilian shipping 
throughout the Persian Gulf. 
Operation Praying Mantis sought to destroy Iran’s Sasson and Rakesh oil platforms 
as well as the frigate Sabalan. A significant portion of Iranian attacks on shipping came 
within 50 nautical miles of oil platforms like these.123 When the U.S. Navy launched the 
operation, Iranian naval forces rushed in defense. Several accounts of the operation through 
news and media reported Iran as losing over half of its total naval forces. In actuality, the 
Iranians lost about one-fifth of their naval units. The units lost, however, were significant. 
Half of Iran’s Saam-class frigates, the Sahand and the Sabalan, were placed out of action 
by the end of the day’s battle. The humiliating loss caused Iranian naval forces to withdraw 
from patrolling the Strait of Hormuz.124 Iran was careful to not cross a U.S. redline by 
using Silkworm missiles during the confrontation. The United States was clear that use of 
the missile, or even a fire control solution, on a U.S. warship would cause a severe 
reaction.125 Iran’s actions throughout most of the Tanker War were highly selective and 
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attempted to delicately balance efforts of demonstrating strength without inciting an 
overwhelming U.S. response. As Iranian naval forces began to respond to Operation 
Praying Mantis, vessels arrived on scene disjointed allowing the superior force to approach 
threats one at a time. Furthermore, Iran’s conventional navy operated independently from 
the IRGCN small boats. Without efforts to coordinate their defense, the United States easily 
countered their threat.126 Despite the investment in asymmetric naval warfare, Iran 
deviated from their strategy and attempted to combat the United States on a symmetric 
level. Iran’s main miscalculation throughout the Tanker War was in the American resolve 
and political will to remain in the Middle East.127 The United States did not depart at the 
first sign of Iranian resistance, they retaliated with superior force. 
Despite the embarrassment felt by Iranians at the hands of Operation Praying 
Mantis, IRGCN leadership remains convinced that an asymmetric approach can balance 
against U.S. naval power. The Iranians learned many lessons from that single day of 
combat. This has left Iran feeling that despite their glaring mistakes in battle, if the 
asymmetric approach were properly applied a different outcome may have occurred.128 
Realistically, Iran has no other options to explore strategically within the maritime domain. 
Whether asymmetric naval strategies are best suited to counteract the U.S. Navy is 
irrelevant as Iran cannot commit to any other approach. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Iran’s current approach to naval warfare is self-recognizably a suboptimal choice. 
However, given the economic restraints and continued isolation from the international 
community, Iran is left with few viable options. Any future attempt to challenge enemy 
forces in the maritime domain will be conducted using asymmetric naval strategies and 
tactics. This chapter demonstrated Iran’s historical interest in the maritime domain. 
Favorable relations with the United States granted Iran unprecedented access to defense 
industries capable of providing the IIN with the latest naval technology. The Islamic 
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Revolution changed the trajectory of Iran in several aspects, to include the procurement 
and maintenance of a naval fleet. This event, and its ongoing effects, have altered Iran’s 
national security strategy, economic development, and political standing in the world. 
Adherence to self-reliance means that Iran, with its limited domestic capability, can only 
use alternative and cost-effective methods of asymmetric naval warfare. Although the 
Islamic Republic would prefer a naval strategy based on conventional forces, the means to 
do so are far from their grasp. The Tanker War, ending with Operation Praying Mantis, 
serves as the only major naval surface engagement that Iran has had with the United States. 
Despite early Iranian successes with the use of sea mines, the U.S. Navy easily countered 
Iranian asymmetric naval threats once fully mobilized. As the United States deployed 
additional units to the Persian Gulf, Iran became increasingly aware that the superpower 
was committed to ending the Tanker War. Sustained operations from the U.S. Navy 
deterred Iran from using Silkworm ASMs and reduced IRGCN patrols of the Strait of 
Hormuz. Despite their defeat, IRGCN leadership continue to shape the organization’s 
military doctrine, training, and asset procurement around lessons learned from the Tanker 
War. Iran is devoted to asymmetric naval warfare for defense of its coastal waters. 
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III. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
Seeking to overcome strategic shortcomings of the Tanker War, Iran relies upon 
technological advancements to enhance its asymmetric naval threat. Outside of these 
improvements, Iran’s core assets used to challenge adversaries within the maritime domain 
have essentially remained the same since the late 1980s. Over forty years of pursuing a 
national security strategy based on self-reliance has limited Iran’s options in acquiring 
modern military weaponry. This chapter provides a broad overview of Iran’s capabilities 
and limitations within the maritime domain. First, differences between Iran’s two naval 
forces, the IRGCN and IRIN, are discussed. Understanding Iran’s intention for each 
organization will better situate the capabilities and limitations that both navies have while 
conducting operations at sea. Second, Iran’s defense industry is explored to determine the 
state’s domestic capacity to manufacture ships and weapons in support of Iran’s ambitions. 
Lastly, Iran’s principal asymmetric naval threats are expounded upon to provide a better 
understanding of Iranian capability within the maritime domain. The research confirms 
Iran’s unwavering commitment to a naval strategy based on sea denial and coastal defense. 
With a defense industry limited by financial constraints and infrastructure capacity, Iran 
continues to pursue interests in the maritime domain through comparatively inexpensive 
asymmetric naval assets. However, depending upon Iran’s willingness to engage in 
transactional relationships with foreign states, Iran may become increasingly comfortable 
with using the maritime domain to pursue naval diplomacy with countries that also seek to 
challenge U.S. interests in the region. The prospect of Iran adding blue-water capabilities 
or coordinating naval exercises and deployments with transactional partners supplements 
Iran’s asymmetric approach to the maritime domain. 
A. IRAN’S TWO NAVIES 
Devastating losses incurred during Operation Praying Mantis led Iran to reevaluate 
its anti-shipping campaign and patrols of the Strait of Hormuz. The remaining warships of 
the IIN were deemed incapable of challenging the United States in naval surface 
engagements. Even if IIN warships were optimally manned and outfitted with the latest 
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technology, Iran could not amass a conventional force large enough to challenge the U.S. 
Navy in symmetrical combat. Rather than spend its limited resources on conventional 
warships, Iran deepened its commitment to asymmetric naval warfare. Iran concluded that 
deterring U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf was more cost-effective and achievable through 
use of IRGCN FIACs, ASMs, and sea mines. Following the Tanker War, Iranian naval 
capabilities remained split between two distinct maritime services with overlapping areas 
of responsibility. Today, the IRGCN and IRIN continue to compete for financial resources 
and relevance within the Islamic Republic. Two-thirds of Iran’s total defense budget is 
allotted to the IRGC and its subordinate units. The remaining one-third of Iran’s defense 
budget is split among the traditional military force.129 The IRGCN operates as Iran’s 
favored naval organization because of its evolving asymmetric threat and loyalty to Islamic 
Republic ideals. The IRIN, primarily composed of remnants from the Shah’s IIN, is 
maintained for use as threats against other regional navies. Until recently, the Islamic 
Republic’s favoritism of the IRGCN pushed the IRIN to operate as nothing more than a 
ceremonial force. Decades of preferential treatment allowed the IRGCN to expand their 
maritime capability and outpace IRIN growth. In 2007, reorganization of the maritime 
services and their command-and-control structures clearly delineated separate mission sets 
for Iran’s navies.130 While the IRGCN’s status within the Islamic Republic remains secure, 
the change has granted limited space for the IRIN to explore blue-water interests, test new 
oceangoing platforms, and entertain naval diplomacy with potential transactional partners. 
1. IRGCN 
The IRGCN, serving as Iran’s premier naval force, relies upon a diverse set of 
asymmetric threats to project strength across the Persian Gulf, pursue regional hegemony, 
and deter perceptions of U.S. aggression.131 This chapter’s discussion on Iranian maritime 
capabilities will mostly reflect assets controlled by the IRGCN. The organization’s military 
 
129 Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, CRS Report No. R44017 (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf, 15. 
130 Himes, “Iran’s Two Navies,” 6. 
131 Farzin Nadimi, “Iran Signals a Toughened Stance by Adding to Its Naval Arsenal,” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3335 (June 2020).  
39 
doctrine remains fixated around “guerilla war at sea,” as it was first characterized by United 
States General George Crist during the Tanker War.132 With an emphasis on stealth and 
speed, the limited capabilities of each individual IRGCN unit seek to overcome the 
technological superiority of adversaries by overwhelming targets with sheer numbers. The 
IRGCN’s official mission is to provide Persian Gulf defense and coastal security. The 
organization maintains approximately 20,000 sailors in active service.133 IRGCN training 
focuses on the deployment of swarming surface vessels and weapons saturation against 
vulnerable shipping entering or exiting the Strait of Hormuz’s choke point. The asymmetric 
naval threat is maximized through the expansion of ports, offshore structures, and missile 
launch sites along Iran’s vast coastline. By increasing the number of sites potential threats 
could come from, the IRGCN attempts to complicate U.S. decision-making processes and 
military responses. Individual missile launch sites or weapons storage facilities are difficult 
to detect and an inefficient use of expensive U.S. ordinances.134 This allows the IRGCN 
to conduct targeted, low-scale operations without provoking conflict with the United 
States. 
Iran’s regional influence over the maritime domain is dependent upon the level of 
U.S. naval support to GCC partners. If U.S. involvement in the region decreases, Iran can 
exercise more control over maritime traffic and harass Gulf state rivals. The IRGCN threat 
cannot be evaluated exclusively on its ability to defeat conventional sea power or to exert 
sea control over the Persian Gulf. Evident from Operation Praying Mantis, Iran would 
likely lose a significant portion of their maritime assets in outright naval warfare. The 
IRGCN’s challenge to adversaries within the maritime domain should be measured by their 
advantages over Middle Eastern navies and ability to increase the risk associated with the 
U.S. Navy operating in the Persian Gulf.135 Despite the IRGCN’s lack of conventional 
naval power, their naval force remains quantitatively and qualitatively superior to other 
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regional navies. GCC navies have an approximate combined manpower of 24,700 sailors 
compared to Iran’s total complement of 38,000 sailors between the IRGCN and IRIN.136 
Although the United States is confident in their ability to counter Iranian threats, the 
political cost of a timely asymmetric strike could cause the U.S. Navy to operate with 
caution. For the IRGCN’s deterrence objective, causing the U.S. Navy to pause and 
reconsider movements in the Persian Gulf is a notable achievement.  
2. IRIN 
The IRIN struggled to remain a relevant naval force as Iran shifted away from 
conventional sea power and towards asymmetric naval warfare. The rise of the IRGCN 
made IRIN financial requirements and operational tasking an afterthought for decades, 
relegating the IRIN to a support role.137 Reductions to IRIN budgets began shortly after 
Khomeini’s accession as the new Islamic Republic believed that the traditional military 
force maintaining access to Iran’s best weapons systems could assist opposition in an 
attempted coup.138 The continued emphasis on asymmetric naval warfare prevented the 
IRIN from obtaining the funds necessary for modernization of vessels acquired during the 
late 1970s.139 With approximately 18,000 sailors in the service today, the IRIN is afflicted 
with limitations due to lack of innovation since the Islamic Revolution.140 A significant 
portion of IRIN resources are exclusively used to preserve an aging fleet of Western-built 
ships without access to Western defense industries.141 Despite these glaring shortfalls and 
the disadvantage that IRIN vessels would have in combat with the U.S. Navy, the IRIN 
fleet remains noteworthy by Gulf standards.142 While the IRGCN’s smaller ships and 
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assets are designed purely for asymmetric means against the U.S. Navy, the IRIN projects 
Iranian influence against other Persian Gulf navies. 
Recent Iranian investments in the maritime domain may revive the IRIN’s 
applicability to the government’s naval strategy. Iran’s Naval Industries Organization of 
the Armed Forces (NIO) plan to develop shipyards capable of building larger oceangoing 
ships through the Negin project. Created in January 2019, the NIO oversees all of Iran’s 
naval research and development for surface assets, subsurface units, and naval weapons 
systems. The goal is to design and build a 5,000-7,000 ton destroyer class with vertical 
missile-launching capability.143 While Iran often makes overly ambitious claims about its 
military capabilities, if such a project came to fruition the IRIN would likely have a role in 
testing these acquisitions. Until new surface combatants are available, the IRIN focuses on 
extending its nautical reach with its current inventory. The absence of an extensive 
auxiliary fleet prevents the IRIN from supporting regular rotations of blue-water 
deployments, but does not inhibit operations at sea with a more limited scope.144 Naval 
force reorganization in 2007 allowed the larger surface vessels of the IRIN to focus on 
operations outside of the Persian Gulf. The IRIN has reduced its involvement in naval 
training and live fire exercises to reduce costs associated with fuel, spare parts, and 
supplies. At the detriment of fleet readiness and optimization, this increases resources 
available for deployments to places such as China, Syria, and Sudan.145 The recent maiden 
Atlantic voyage of Makran and Sahand demonstrates Iran’s commitment to expanding 
naval operations.146 Successful long-range deployments from the IRIN will likely set the 
precedent for future IRGCN blue-water missions as their own maritime capabilities 
continue to expand. The IRGCN is currently building a new class of conventional warships 
based on the existing catamaran Shahid Nazeri.147 Constructed from Shahid Mahallati 
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Shipyard in Bushehr, a small boatyard in Bandar Abbas, and a new shipyard near Shib 
Deraz on the island of Qeshm, the IRGCN will compete with the IRIN for control over 
conventional naval forces moving forward. 
While the IRGCN is tasked with Persian Gulf defense and deterring U.S. 
involvement in the region, the IRIN is given a broader role to pursue limited blue-water 
interests and cultivate transactional relationships. This allows the organization to focus on 
operations near Iran’s southeastern coast in the Gulf of Oman.148 Iranian leadership 
foresee the expansion of IRIN deployments as part of a long-term strategy to promote 
Iranian influence beyond the Persian Gulf.149 Naval exercises with China, India, Oman, 
Pakistan, and Russia demonstrate Iran’s use of the IRIN as a mechanism to increase Iranian 
prestige.150 While Iran maintains a national security strategy based on self-reliance, 
decades of international isolation has negatively impacted Iran’s economic and military 
development. This has restricted Iran’s options for achieving deterrence objectives. A 
recent openness to transactional relationships with states antagonistic to U.S. power and 
influence demonstrates Iran’s willingness to temporarily deviate from a hardline self-
sufficiency approach to national security. While transactional relationships are unlikely to 
blossom into lasting alliances, Iran can leverage these relationships against U.S. interests 
in the region. Iran’s use of IRIN naval diplomacy aims to strengthen its position as a 
regional naval power. Since the IRGCN maintains oversight of Persian Gulf defense and 
sea denial strategies, the IRIN can entertain these alternative mission sets without placing 
Iranian national security at immediate risk. 
B. IRAN’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Development of Iran’s maritime force coincides with the regime’s strategic 
emphasis on growing domestic defense and production capabilities. Unilateral economic 
sanctions from the United States have restricted Iran’s ability to purchase technology and 
weapons from foreign markets and further reinforces their approach to indigenous asset 
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procurement. The regime attempts to depict economic hardships as constructive for the 
long-term benefit of the Islamic Republic. Sanctions and economic distress are spun into a 
narrative to convince the public why Iran cannot fully trust anyone within the international 
community and must continue to focus on bolstering its own domestic defense 
capabilities.151 When Iran can acquire foreign technology, the assets are reverse-
engineered and then incorporated into future designs. This approach to defense acquisitions 
pressures Iran’s military to accept delayed production of less sophisticated and lower 
quality equipment.152 However, over time, an emphasis on domestic production could give 
Iran technical experience in advancing its defense industries. Improving proficiencies in 
their own production could assist in narrowing, although never overcoming, the 
technological gap that Iran has with the United States. The priorities of Iran’s defense 
industry align with IRGCN requirements for Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz defense. 
Naval production focuses on smaller and faster platforms that can carry ASMs.153 
However, the division of Iran’s maritime forces between the IRGCN and IRIN creates 
institutional tension that challenges the defense industry in meeting the needs of both 
organizations. Even with a clear emphasis on asymmetric naval warfare, the friction 
between maritime services prevents the maximization of an integrated approach to the 
maritime domain.154 This limits Iran’s defense industry effectiveness and prevents the 
military from obtaining the quality and quantity of assets required for national security 
objectives. 
Iran’s defense industry is stunted by economic policy decisions made by the Islamic 
Republic as it first came to power. International isolation caused by the Islamic Revolution, 
quickly followed by the prolonged Iran-Iraq War, forced the government to allocate 
resources towards military endeavors that could have been spent in other public sectors. 
Oil revenues were funding the war effort rather than being invested into education, 
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healthcare, and other basic infrastructure needs.155 The long-term effects of these choices 
constrain Iran’s economy and have reduced funds available for investment in the defense 
industry. Iran’s domestic defense capabilities are also hindered, to some degree, by 
international sanctions but simultaneously reinforce the importance of developing 
homegrown assets in the absence of access to foreign markets. From 2013 to 2015, 
international sanctions reduced Iranian military spending per year by around $9 billion.156 
The Trump administration claimed that its maximum pressure campaign caused Iran’s 
defense budget to decrease by 24% for 2020–2021.157 However, as a share of Gross 
Domestic Product, Iran’s 2.7% military spending was above the global average of 2.3% 
from 2008 to 2017.158 This indicates that international sanctions may not significantly alter 
Iran’s economic priorities. While reductions in military spending are seen, larger impacts 
are evident in other sectors of the economy. Sanctions place restrictions on free trade and 
banking transactions that make conducting business difficult.159 Nevertheless, Iran’s 
priority on military spending has led research to conclude that U.S. unilateral sanctions a 
minimal long-term effect. For the United States to achieve their desired outcome, sanctions 
must be enforced in a multilateral effort. A coordinated effort could reduce Iranian military 
spending by 77% over the long-term (approximately ten years).160 The Iranian economy 
is impacted by sanctions and a separation from the global market. Despite these obstacles, 
the regime has sacrificed investments in other areas to continue funding the military and 
defense industry for national security goals. 
Naval production, in comparison to other military initiatives, requires more time, 
personnel, and resources. Construction is an arduous process, taking up to ten years of 
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labor. Adequately training a naval force to operate warships can be just as lengthy of a 
process.161 Furthermore, a state undergoing a naval build-up must understand the initial 
costs, ongoing maintenance costs, and material constraints that can limit capacity. Even 
when the material state of a defense industry is strong, the products will hold little value if 
the personnel operating the equipment are unable to receive proper training.162 Budgeting 
for national security becomes complicated when weighing all these factors. Therefore, for 
Iran to optimize its spending and pose a challenge to adversaries within the maritime 
domain, it is critical to properly identify the most applicable threats, the best ways to 
counter those threats, and the availability of transactional partners willing to assist in their 
defense endeavors.163 The world’s shipbuilding industries of today have increasingly 
shifted towards dependence on other nations in a globalized society. Where a nation’s 
domestic capacity was once critical to facilitating naval power, coordination with other 
nations allow medium powers additional avenues towards building naval fleets.164 Due to 
the expense of military power, Iran is forced to balance domestic investments in the 
economy against the military requirements needed to protect national interests and 
demonstrate regional power.165 Separation from the international community prevents Iran 
from benefitting on the increasingly interconnected shipbuilding market. While the United 
States can efficiently produce conventional naval power with the cooperation of partners, 
Iran struggles to domestically maintain an arsenal of asymmetric naval threats. 
Iran’s Defense Industry Organization of approximately 20,000 personnel are 
responsible for the production and supply of all Iran’s armed forces requirements.166 The 
NIO oversees naval research and development, focusing primarily on the advancement of 
blue-water capabilities. IRGCN asymmetric naval threats are produced through a 
coordinated effort from several other organizations. The Iran Shipbuilding and Offshore 
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Industries Complex Company (ISOICO), based near Bandar Abbas, is a leading entity in 
shipbuilding and offshore structure construction.167 While the ISOICO is known for its 
construction of larger cargo vessels for the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line Group, 
they are a sister organization to other shipbuilding companies that are more directly 
involved with military efforts. In 2009, the IRGC-owned construction company Khatam 
al-Anbiya purchased 51.18% of the Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA).168 
SADRA specializes in shipbuilding and construction of docks and port facilities that are 
required for the IRGCN’s smaller assets. The organization’s construction of the 
supertanker Sorocaima for export to Venezuela became the largest ship ever built in the 
Middle East and points to a growing Iranian domestic capability for shipbuilding.169 On 
the other hand, Iran’s domestic shipbuilding industry does not have the access or capacity 
to incorporate the world’s latest technology and weapons systems into ship designs. What 
is often touted as new by Iranian leadership are either outdated designs from the Shah’s 
reign or prototypes that lack any evidence of operability. Reverse-engineered or restored 
assets from Iranian engineers are used as propaganda to assist in the continuing diversion 
of government funds from economic needs into military-ran defense organizations. 
Considering Iran’s economic constraints, their ability to maintain aging platforms in an 
operational condition is commendable. However, the capabilities of Iran’s defense industry 
remain limited to designs deemed obsolete by U.S. standards.170 Resources for future 
research and development remain heavily limited and will continue to lag behind defense 
industries of the West. Iran’s narrow capacity for domestic defense production, without 
any significant changes, will steadily fall behind the operational needs of Iran’s lofty 
ambitions. 
A more precise knowledge of Iran’s defense industry capabilities is limited due to 
the classified nature of reports pertaining to Iran’s research and development spending. 
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Iran’s defense industry has remained isolated from Western assistance since 1979 after the 
fall of the Shah’s regime. U.S. support of Iran immediately stopped and beginning in 1984 
the United States officially sanctioned any weapons sale to Iran. In 1995, all U.S. trade 
with Iran was banned.171 Within the maritime domain, Iran’s defense industry has 
demonstrated an ability to reverse-engineer modern engines and continues to develop 
electronics, radar, and communication systems.172 Swarming small boats dependence on 
communication and navigation make advancements in these systems critical to improving 
Iran’s asymmetric approach. Iran’s improvements in shipbuilding and offshore floating oil 
rigs have garnered the attention of the international community.173 Germany, Belgium, 
and Venezuela have all pursued contracts with SADRA and ISOICO for their own 
maritime needs. Iran’s defense industry accomplishments, from a regional perspective, are 
meaningful. However, Iran will remain limited to domestic production of less sophisticated 
asymmetric threats. Iran’s strategy within the maritime domain will continue to rely upon 
these inexpensive threats for use against the U.S. Navy. 
C. SURFACE VESSELS 
Ali Fadavi, former IRGCN Commander, stated that the speed of his small boats 
provided unique challenges to the modern conventional warship. His confidence was 
grounded in the difficulty vessels have in tracking FIAC with radar which would allow 
IRGCN small boats to reach their targets and employ weapons prior to being located.174 
Table 1 lists the IRGCN’s most notable surface vessels currently in the organization’s 
inventory. Precise figures of IRGCN assets are difficult to acquire due to the ease with 
which small boats can be hidden. FIAC are stored throughout Iran’s coastline of inlets, 
coves, and other offshore structures. Furthermore, uncertainty as to whether FIAC are new 
construction or renovated adds to the challenge of determining accurate numbers of active 
IRGCN units. The Thondor fast attack craft (FAC) class, more commonly referred to as 
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the Houdong class, was considered the IRGCN’s most formidable surface vessel for years. 
Acquired in the 1990s from China and armed with C-802 ASMs, Iran relied exclusively on 
this vessel for power projection in the Persian Gulf well into the 2000s. However, due to 
technological advancements and the increased production of naval and airborne ASM 
launch platforms, the Houdong’s importance has decreased.175 The class remains in active 
service and routinely patrols Iran’s coastlines among the growing arsenal of other 
asymmetric naval threats. 
IRGCN naval asset production continues to focus on increasingly smaller, lighter, 
and faster craft. The Boghammer, carrying a maximum payload of 450 kilograms, is easily 
transported to strategic islands across the Persian Gulf by way of Amphibious Lift Ships. 
In addition to the IRGCN main headquarters at Bandar Abbas, the Boghammer is 
transported to and housed at Farsi, Sirri, and Abu Musa islands. During the IRGCN’s 
formative years, the Boghammer was the primary surface vessel used as Iran’s asymmetric 
naval threat during the Tanker War.176 As the small boat fleet has modernized, the IRGCN 
has invested in other classes including the Ashoora and Seraj FIACs. The Ashoora class is 
a Boston Whaler type craft based on designs from the United Kingdom. Produced 
domestically, the Ashoora is used in multiple capacities depending on the required mission. 
Newer versions of the class can carry heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, or up to four 
contact mines.177 The Seraj class, also referred to as Bladerunners, are likely the IRGCN’s 
preferred FIAC option moving forward. The Seraj was also reverse engineered from a UK 
design. Its unique air-entrapment monohull gives a steadier ride at higher speeds and sea-
states. Improved handling and maneuverability make this asset ideal for swarm and hit-
and-run tactics.  
In May 2020, Iranian media stated that 112 small boats from various FIAC classes 
were placed in active service by the IRGCN.178 U.S. intelligence is unable to determine if 
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the vessels were upgrades from units already in service or if they truly are new additions. 
If the 112 units are new additions, the figure represents a considerable expansion of inshore 
vessels to the IRGCN inventory. These newly acquired IRGCN surface vessels claim high 
speeds in excess of 70 knots, carry explosives, and are intended for suicide missions. The 
IRGCN’s surface fleet is limited by a lack of over-the-horizon weapons systems and other 
sensors that can extend the useful range of units. An emphasis of Iran’s defense industry 
to upgrade radar capabilities and the expansion of miniature bases and offshore structures 
across the Persian Gulf seek to reduce this technological disparity.179 Despite the 
shortcomings of individuals IRGCN units, a growing inventory of FIAC expands the 
opportunities for swarming operations against unsuspecting vessels. As additional ports 
and offshore structures become readily available, IRGCN FIAC can launch offensives from 
a continuously expanding list of locations across the Persian Gulf. IRGCN goals to expand 
oceangoing capabilities are evident by new concept designs of high-aspect-ratio twin-hull 
support (HARTH) vessels. Based on the design of the IRGCN catamaran Shahid Nazeri, 
the organization aims to extend its naval endurance into open ocean.180 These ambitions 
are, however, limited by the fact that the Shahid Nazeri has spent majority of its service 
time moored to a pier at IRGCN headquarters. Structural analysis of the vessel indicates 
that its aluminum hull is susceptible to rough seas. The IRIN’s small contingency of 
frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, and submarines remain the only reliable blue-water 
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Design Origin Max Speed Weapons 
Thondor 
(Houdong) 
10 Chinese Huangfen class 35 knots 
4 Noor (C-802) or 4 Ghader (C-
802A) 
C 14 9 Iran (two known variants) 50 knots 4 Nasr-1 (C-704) 
Mk-13 10 China 60 knots 2 Nasr-1 (C-704) 
Peykaap 1 
(IPS 16) 
15 North Korea 52 knots 324 mm lightweight torpedoes 
Peykaap II 
(IPS 16 Mod) 
25 North Korea 52 knots 
2 Kosar (C-701) or 2 Nasr-1 (C-
704) 
Peykaap III 6 North Korea 52 knots 
Addition of 12.7 mm machine 
guns to Peykaap II class 
Tir 
(IPS 18) 
10 North Korea 52 knots 533 mm torpedoes 
Tarlan 15 Iran 50 knots 
May support wire/laser-guided 
weapons system 
Kashdom II 15 Iran 50 knots 12.7 mm machine guns 
Shahid Nazeri Unknown Iran Unknown 




10 U.S. Mk II class 36 knots 23 mm machine guns 
Ghaem 
(MIG-S-1800) 
20 Iran 18 knots 20 mm Oerlikon 
Murce 
(MIG-G-0900) 
30 Russia 30 knots 




100 UK 40 knots Being replaced by Bladerunners 
Boghammar 20 Iran 46 knots 
RPG-7 rocket launcher and 12-
barrelled 107 mm rocket launcher 
Seraj 
(Bladerunner) 
50 Iran 75 knots 
12.7 mm machine gun and 11-
tubed 107 mm multiple launch 
rocket system 
Figures for IRGCN vessels in service are estimates.181 
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D. ANTI-SHIP MISSILES 
The U.S. Navy is most bothered by Iran’s increasing arsenal of ASMs.182 This 
concern originated with Iran’s acquisition of Chinese-manufactured Silkworm coastal 
defense cruise missiles during the Tanker War. The IRGCN’s inventory of domestically 
produced missiles, largely based on Chinese C-802 and C-700 series cruise missiles, has 
expanded over the decades.183 Attempts to modernize ASMs, extend maximum ranges, 
and improve accuracy are among Iran’s highest priorities for naval modernization 
efforts.184 A list of Iran’s notable ASMs in service are listed in Table 2. Despite Iran’s 
improvements in ASM technology, Iran remains unable to complete a successful 
widespread attack without consequence. Although Iran could feasibly carry out an initial 
offensive, shore-based ASM sites would immediately be exposed upon launch and serve 
as targets for their adversaries.185 Iran mitigates the problem of U.S. retaliatory strikes by 
spreading the ASM threat across a growing network of launch sites. In doing so, the loss 
of an individual coastal defense site has minimal impact on Iran’s capability to conduct 
further operations. Shore-based ASM sites remain attractive for Iran to employ sea denial 
strategies and deter security threats across the maritime domain. Since sea control remains 
an unattainable naval strategy for Iran to pursue, the improvement of long-range weapons 
systems is critical to achieving defense of territorial waters.186 ASMs are used by Iran to 
substitute for a lack of conventional air and naval power. While Iran’s missile arsenal 
acquired from the West during the last days of the Shah are past expiration, the operational 
status of domestically produced missiles remains uncertain.187 A growing stockpile of 
advanced C-802  ASMs with increased range remains a concern for U.S. Navy warships 
 
The Military Balance, “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” 120, no. 1 (February 2020), 
348–352.  
182 Nadimi, “Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare,” 20. 
183 Office of Naval Intelligence, “Iranian Naval Forces,” 32. 
184 Office of Naval Intelligence, “Iran’s Naval Forces,” 25. 
185 Singh, “Dark Chill in the Persian Gulf,” 122. 
186 Shang-su Wu, “The Modern Naval Fortress: An Additional Sea Denial Option for Coastal States,” 
Defence Studies 18, no. 1 (2018): 80–81. 
187 Cordesman, “Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities,” 55. 
52 
operating in the region. Future coordination and arms deals with great powers opposed to 
U.S. influence could amplify the Iranian ASM threat even further. 
Iranian ASM development and production is overseen by the Samen Alaeme 
Industrial Group which is a subordinate organization of Iran’s Aerospace Industries 
Organization.188 Various ASMs of Chinese design provide the foundation of Iran’s missile 
defense. The Nasr (C-704) has long been the medium-range ASM of choice for Iran’s Air 
Force and developed ship-to-ship capability as early as December 2008. In March 2014, 
Iran improved the Nasr by upgrading the weapon, based on Chinese C-704KD designs, 
with a passive television camera or infrared seeker.189 The Noor (C-802) is categorized as 
a long-range ASM and is also in the inventory of the Iranian Air Force. The IRGCN most 
notably arm these ASMs on Houdong FAC but have expanded their use on other small 
boats as upgrades to ASM platforms are made. The radar-guided Noor ASM evolved from 
an earlier Chinese C-801 design and is comparable to the U.S. AGM-84 Harpoon. The 
Noor’s improved baseline, in comparison to earlier models, comes with an increased range 
and warhead size. The next step in the evolution of this line of ASMs is the Ghadir. With 
an elongated airframe in comparison to its predecessors, the Ghadir can be deployed on an 
even wider array of launch mechanisms with a range of up to 300 kilometers.190 Iran has 
also made strides in improving naval ballistic missile capabilities. The Zolfaghar Basir was 
unveiled in September 2020 and has a stated 700 kilometer range for coastal defense.191 If 
true, the range of this new weapon would drastically upgrade Iran’s defensive capabilities 
and expand the reach that Iran could reliably strike targets within the maritime domain. 
ASMs and ballistic missiles remain the most promising aspect of Iran’s defense 
industry and warrants attention from the United States.192 Iran places most of its available 
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resources for future research and development into the growth of missile capabilities.193 
While all of Iran’s current ASMs are subsonic, there are indications that the defense 
industry is aggressively seeking to acquire a ramjet engine capable of supersonic 
propulsion.194 This upgrade, if realized, would present a significant improvement to Iran’s 
ASM threat. Although Iran has demonstrated its ability to reverse-engineer complete 
missiles without modification, other hurdles remain in place. Integrating the missiles with 
advanced weapons systems, maintenance, testing, and overall production quality must be 
verified before Iran can claim success. Limited public information is available to determine 
Iran’s entire missile production capability and stockpile. What remains certain is that Iran’s 
missile threat remains a viable political weapon. This asymmetric naval threat is a cost-
effective deterrent to U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf. In coordination with 
IRGCN surface assets, ASM weapons saturation can pressure a conventional warship’s 
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Table 2. Notable IRGCN Anti-ship Missiles. Adapted from Janes (2020) 
and The Military Balance. 
Name Year in Production Range Notes 
Hormuz series 2011 300 km Active radar-guidance system 
Nasr 2010 35 km TV-guidance like Chinese C-704KD 
Nasr-e Basir 2014 35 km Anti-jamming capabilities 
Khalij Fars 2011 150 km Based on Fateh-110 tactical ballistic missile 
Zafar 2011 25 km 
Short-range radar-guided optimized for use on 
FAC 
Noor 2004 120 km Based on Chinese C-801 
Ghadir 2015 300 km 
Based on Chinese C-802 and evolved form of 
Noor 
Ya Ali 2014 700 km 
Designed to be used on a cruise missile with 
fixed wings 
Kosar 2004 15 km Older version of the Zafar 
HY-2 
(CH-SSC-3 Seersucker) 
1995 105 km Possibly stopped development 
K-300P Not yet acquired 300 km Russian coastal defense system 
Zolfaghar Basir 2020 700 km 
Naval ballistic missile for coastal defense 
system 
Ranges given are approximate or stated figures from IRGC leaders. Not all systems verified in 
testing.195 
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E. SEA MINES 
Although difficult to accurately assess Iran’s inventory, mines remain an efficient 
way to ensure coastal defense. The IRGCN considers minelaying to be one of its most 
important tools in providing defense throughout the Persian Gulf and would be vital in any 
effort to close the Strait of Hormuz. The development of more sophisticated mines appears 
to be within Iran’s technological capability considering other advances the country has 
made in its missile program. Iran’s self-proclaimed proliferation of limpet mines, moored 
contact mines, bottom-laying influence mines, and remote-controlled mines present a 
comprehensive sea mine threat.196  If the IRGCN does have access to this assortment of 
mines, the Iranian asymmetric naval threat becomes more credible. The Strait of Hormuz 
typically retains tidal currents of up to four knots which makes reliably setting mines in 
precise locations near impossible.197 Further development of advanced mines may change 
the strategic landscape in Iran’s favor. If different types of mines can be deployed with 
higher precision, the IRGCN could partially block access to the Strait of Hormuz while 
simultaneously leaving room for Iran to use alternative clear passages. Minesweepers from 
the U.S. Navy would take several weeks in verifying the Strait of Hormuz clear of mines. 
For weapons that cost in the thousands of dollars, their economic impact on the global 
market would be vast if used to halt trade in the Persian Gulf. 
Mining coastal waters, to the extent that a blockade would be enforced, likely 
remains outside of Iran’s interest.198 As rudimentary as mine warfare may seem, effective 
employment of mines requires a refined approach. While the IRGCN has recently 
demonstrated their use of limpet mines against commercial maritime traffic, widespread 
mining operations of the Strait of Hormuz have not been conducted in decades. An 
individual mine has limited capability, however, the strategic positioning of a minefield 
can cause an adversary to proceed with caution. To maximize the effect of a minefield, 
military strategists and planners must understand the capabilities and limitations of their 
 
196 Nadimi, “Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare,” 24. 
197 Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 97. 
198 Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, 57. 
56 
mines and what measures would be needed to counter their presence. Successful mine 
warfare requires a level of training and time to plan.199 The Iranian mine threat includes a 
stockpile of over 6,000 mines. Iran has developed a range of platforms across surface, 
subsurface, and air delivery mechanisms to deploy these low-cost, low-tech, high-impact 
assets. Furthermore, the ability to lay mines covertly, whether by using unsuspecting 
commercial vessels or small craft, gives Iran a layer of anonymity.200 The ability to deny 
culpability in a possible mine strike allows Iran to provide coastal defense without granting 
the United States explicit evidence to warrant retaliation with conventional force. 
Meanwhile, even the threat of a minefield will cause the U.S. Navy to proceed with caution 
while operating in the Persian Gulf. The resources needed to counter suspected mine areas 
would require massive mobilization. The IRGCN deploying mines in a large-scale effort 
will likely remain a last resort option. Iran continues to depend upon uninterrupted access 
of the Strait of Hormuz for trade. However, if left with no other strategic alternatives, sea 
mines are an effective asymmetric naval threat for sea denial strategies.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Since the end of the Tanker War, Iran’s naval forces have emphasized the 
asymmetric naval threat for coastal defense and sea denial. For nearly three decades, Iran 
neglected its remaining conventional naval assets to expand upon smaller, lighter, and 
faster units. A naval reorganization in 2007 has granted the IRIN limited space to remain 
relevant in Iran’s strategic vision of the maritime domain. While the IRGCN remains the 
premier naval force, tasked with responsibility of Persian Gulf defense, the IRIN has 
opportunity to pursue blue-water interests and explore tenets of naval diplomacy with 
partners. The prospect of IRIN deployments showcases an Iranian interest within the 
maritime domain that extends beyond the Persian Gulf. While these deployments remain 
limited in scope compared to the U.S. Navy, the move has implications for future Iranian 
national defense goals. The Iranian defense industry, despite its notable progress since the 
1980s, lacks in its ability to widely produce modern military assets. Although difficult to 
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ascertain exact figures, the Iranian defense industry will remain limited to producing 
asymmetric naval threats. The Iranian naval surface threat is centered around the 
proliferation of small boats. Iran’s missile threat is the foundation of its military power as 
Iran’s geography is advantageous to the proliferation of shore-based launch sites. As 
smaller, faster, and cheaper surface vessels improve their ASM capability, the Iranian 
missile threat will continue to threaten U.S. naval operations from various sources. Lastly, 
the mine threat remains an affordable asymmetric naval threat that can slow maritime 
traffic throughout the Persian Gulf and have global economic consequences. 
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IV. STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
Technological improvements have magnified the Iranian asymmetric naval threat 
but the strategic approach continues to limit the scope of Iranian maritime operations. 
Asymmetric warfare is not suitable as an offensive military strategy against great powers. 
As a result, the U.S. Navy does not perceive Iran as an imminent maritime threat. If 
increasing tensions between Iran and the United States culminated in war, U.S. 
conventional sea power would decisively route Iranian maritime forces.201 Iran 
understands that interactions with the U.S. Navy must be calculated and fall short of 
provoking outright conflict. Implementation of specific strategies and tactics allow Iran to 
leverage asymmetric threats and pursue deterrence objectives without enticing a U.S. 
response. This chapter concentrates on how Iran deploys its asymmetric naval threat to 
achieve desired outcomes within the maritime domain. First, Iran’s overarching sea denial 
and deterrence-based strategy will be reviewed. Next, discussion of Iran’s geographic 
advantages, use of swarming vessels, and information operations will further explain Iran’s 
desired application of asymmetric naval threats. The chapter will then consider Iran’s 
relationships with Russia and China as an indirect challenge to the United States. These 
relationships could expand the presence of Eastern naval forces in the Persian Gulf and 
present a greater threat to U.S. interests in the region. Finally, the chapter will briefly 
examine two interactions at sea with Iranian naval forces. These events demonstrate Iran’s 
willingness to use the maritime domain in challenging the status quo, but also demonstrates 
their caution in pursuing aggressive courses of action. 
A. SEA DENIAL 
Conventional naval forces pursue command of the sea and unobstructed use of 
waters for their state’s own purposes.202 Iran’s asymmetric naval force is incapable of 
achieving sea control. Instead, Iran implements a sea denial and deterrence-based strategy 
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to challenge the enduring presence of the U.S. Navy in the region.203 Sea denial is a 
maritime strategy for weaker powers which attempts to interrupt sea control of a superior 
naval force.204 Iran can utilize narrow waterways to compress distances for surprise 
attacks, limit adversary’s response times to threats, and deter the U.S. Navy from 
conducting operations near their coastlines. Sociopolitical developments of the modern 
world contribute to Iran’s ability to challenge great powers. The international community’s 
emphasis on state rights, territorial sovereignty, and self-defense places restrictions on U.S. 
military action.205  Weaker powers, such as Iran, that do not place themselves under the 
same set of rules can violate international norms with minimal repercussions. The speed at 
which media outlets can falsely present developing events can cause further problems for 
the United States to overcome. Without a favorable political narrative, U.S. military action 
is difficult to justify. Lastly, the U.S. Navy faces limitations to power projection in the 
maritime domain unless local partners are willing to provide continued support for their 
mission.206 Access to ports and logistics are critical to keeping the U.S. Navy on station 
for extended periods. If there were ways to undermine U.S. support, Iran could incidentally 
limit the U.S. Navy’s presence in the region. 
Superior conventional sea power is not required to successfully implement a sea 
denial strategy. Technological advancements of FIACs, ASMs, and sea mines allow 
weaker powers to challenge sea control in an efficient manner. Improvements in the range 
and accuracy of weapons systems allow for even rudimentary munitions to contest navies 
operating near coastlines. Specifically, the extended range of asymmetric naval threats 
means that conventional sea power can only remain unchallenged in waters that are a safe 
distance from their adversary’s weapons systems.207 Correspondingly, conventional sea 
power tactics that require close distances to shore, such as blockade, are diminished by 
weaker powers’ access to modern technology. In today’s maritime environment, great 
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powers that wish to exert sea control, especially in areas that have narrow waterways, must 
arrive on station with overwhelming force. However, great powers must also ensure they 
maintain space in deep water that allows maneuverability.208 Confining a small number of 
units in restricted waters presents vulnerable targets for asymmetric naval threats. Sea 
denial operations can remain limited in scope while maintaining their desired effect. 
Sporadic hit-and-run tactics or the threat of a mined waterway can make the adversary 
question their level of sea control.209 Therefore, small-scale sea denial operations from an 
asymmetric naval force can cause conventional naval forces to pause when implemented 
correctly and serve as a viable deterrent factor.  
The Islamic Republic constantly analyzes the political scene for opportunities to 
increase its leverage and compel change among its adversaries’ policy in the Middle 
East.210 The IRGCN’s occasional aggressive behavior in their perceived defense of the 
Persian Gulf is one of the primary ways the regime uses the maritime domain to challenge 
U.S. presence in the region. With lessons learned from the Tanker War, the IRGCN has 
steadily built its self-confidence in asymmetric naval warfare.211 Using islands and 
offshore platforms, the IRGCN has grown its network of asymmetric power projection in 
the Persian Gulf. Threats against the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are aimed to escalate 
the cost of conflict and deter the United States from protracted war in the region. The 
threats are backed by Iran’s arsenal of missiles and mines deployed by their array of small 
boats.212 Hostile actions against regional adversaries’ oil platforms and civilian maritime 
traffic aim to increase the costs associated with operating in the Persian Gulf and remind 
the region of Iran’s hegemonic ambitions. Regardless, the IRGCN is careful to contain 
their operations within the cover of gray zone conflict. The organization is careful to not 
overtly break international law and avoid unwanted escalation. Sea denial strategy and 
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asymmetric naval warfare give Iran the greatest flexibility and affordability in maintaining 
a level of influence in the maritime domain. 
B. GEOGRAPHY 
Iran benefits from its geography by utilizing a string of strategic islands located 
within immediate range of the Strait of Hormuz. These positions defend access to economic 
resources and place IRGCN assets in close proximity to all nautical traffic entering or 
exiting the Strait of Hormuz.213 Islands, inlets, coves, and offshore structures all extend 
IRGCN main base operations and serve as the primary links to the navy’s surveillance 
system of the Persian Gulf.214 The Tunb Islands and Abu Musa are likely the most 
important pieces of this IRGCN network. Territorial dispute over these islands remains an 
ongoing source of tension between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. While Iran has 
maintained its physical presence on the islands, the UAE continues to appeal to the 
international community for its own lawful claims of sovereign control over the territories. 
Control over the Tunb Islands and Abu Musa grant Iran legal claim to underwater mineral 
rights and wider claims to territorial waters.215 Since Iran already claims that it can legally 
control access to the Strait of Hormuz, claiming ownership of disputed islands further 
legitimizes their view as being guardians of the Persian Gulf.216 Iran continues to press its 
claims and reserves rights to create artificial islands and offshore structures in the future to 
extend its influence in the region. 
Confined waters of the Strait of Hormuz, in addition to Iran’s chain of islands, 
greatly impacts ships’ ability to freely maneuver. The strait’s choke point grants Iran an 
advantage in deploying small boats and weapons against defenseless targets. The IRGCN’s 
asymmetric tactics in this small area capitalize on the already confusing environment. With 
thousands of vessels transiting throughout the Persian Gulf daily, IRGCN vessels can hide 
amongst civilian traffic and impact their adversary’s ability to distinguish a hostile target. 
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Sirri Island, Larak Island, and Qeshm were all integral parts of Iran’s war effort during the 
Tanker War. Chinese Silkworm missiles were positioned at these strategic locations in the 
chance that conflict escalated. Iran never targeted U.S. warships with the Silkworm 
missiles out of fear of retaliation, however, Iran has certainly placed more advanced 
weapons at these locations today. Additionally, photographic evidence of Qeshm 
demonstrates how the IRGCN uses geography to disguise its units. Part of the naval base 
includes an underground pen suspected of housing manned and unmanned speedboats.217 
Waterborne improvised explosive devices and suicide boats add another element to the 
IRGCN threat base. Shallow waters of the southern Persian Gulf are strewn with numerous 
small coral islands, underwater mounds, and offshore structures which restrict navigation 
and force traffic to utilize designated deep-water channels.218 IRGCN surveillance of these 
channels allows coastal weapons systems to be prepared for attack and surface vessels to 
rapidly respond to a contact of interest.  
The growing demand for navies to operate in or near the littorals has a significant 
impact on the future of naval warfare. Playing into Iranian geographic advantages, the 
littorals provide shorter distances for IRGCN vessels to travel and reduce the time the U.S. 
Navy has in making decisions. Of all the geographical factors that influence naval warfare, 
distance remains the element that will present the greatest challenges to overcome. Even 
with technological advances in transportation and communications, distance can affect the 
success on an operation.219 Larger, deep draft vessels face even more dangers as they are 
drawn into conducting operations in the littorals. Islands, shoals, reefs, rocks, and sand bars 
create advantages for Iran’s coastal defense and challenges for their adversaries.220 
Without open water, conventional sea power is susceptible to the many shore-based 
weapons systems and offshore defensive structures that Iran has built. The presence of both 
natural obstacles to navigation and man-made structures present serious hazards to naval 
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operations in the littorals.221 Iran’s naval forces hold distinct mobility advantages in their 
littorals. Their shallow draft, smaller vessels can overcome the distance factor efficiently 
and is the distinct advantage Iran has over adversarial naval forces.222 Lastly, bad weather 
can adversely affect the electronics of modern warships. The typical hot and humid weather 
of the Persian Gulf, in addition to the occasional sandstorm, reduce visibility and the 
viability of radar and weapons systems.223 Within the littorals, where U.S. warships are 
already constrained, if access to advanced electronic systems is impaired IRGCN assets 
pose a greater threat. 
C. SWARMING 
According to Arquila and Ronfeldt, swarming is “the systematic pulsing of force 
and/or fire by dispersed, internetted units, so as to strike the adversary from all directions 
simultaneously.”224 While swarming tactics do not necessitate a complete encirclement of 
an enemy target, the approach places units in a position where they can strike from several 
positions at any given moment. A successful execution of the swarming tactic must meet a 
minimum of two criteria: (1) proper communication and coordination among attacking 
units to maximize attack angles against the adversary and (2) in addition to the strike 
operations, the units must conduct surveillance and communicate observations back to a 
central command center.225 In 2007, Iranian military leadership made the decision to 
reorganize its maritime services’ areas of responsibility.226 Alongside this decision, Iran 
decentralized its command structure to decrease reliance on communications.227 In the 
event of a large-scale attack, centralized control over large swarms of FIAC could slow 
response time. Decentralization grants more autonomy to naval districts in executing their 
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commander’s intent. The changes to command-and-control, alongside the decision to 
restructure water-space management between the IRGCN and IRIN, also mitigated the 
potential issues that each maritime force would have in communicating with one 
another.228 The reorganization of naval forces allows local commanders of IRGCN units 
to coordinate swarming tactics independently. The emphasis is now placed on direct 
communication between the vessels in immediate proximity to one another, with 
surveillance and further information relayed to main headquarters for follow-on tasking 
guidance. IRGCN small boats are no longer waiting on decisions from the top of military 
leadership to execute a given mission. Moreover, the autonomy given to local IRGCN 
commanders makes it difficult for U.S. intelligence to determine who is issuing orders for 
an attack. If the Islamic Republic wanted to deny culpability to an aggressive action, they 
could blame the event on the misunderstandings of an overzealous unit and attempt to 
prevent further escalation. 
The elements of surprise, deception, and decentralization among a group of highly 
maneuverable units play into IRGCN swarm tactics.229 The concept is similar to the human 
wave attacks that IRGC ground forces used throughout the Iran-Iraq War. The stealth 
element of unconventional naval warfare is amplified within the operational factor of 
space. Due to small distances being involved in these operations, close-range missions and 
engagements can reduce the technological advantages held by U.S. conventional sea 
power.230 Swarming tactics involve deploying dozens, or even hundreds, of armed small 
boats from a variety of locations to converge on an isolated target.231 Iran has been 
working on developing swarming formations since the Tanker War. Compared to 
conventional naval warfare, swarming small boats are deemed to be the more cost-effective 
approach to challenging U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf.232 The addition of around 1,500 
remote-controlled suicide drone boats along key Persian Gulf coastal areas makes the 
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IRGCN threat seem more credible.233 Despite the attention that Iranian swarming tactics 
receives, the IRGCN has only executed such attacks on two occasions. During Operation 
Praying Mantis, IRGCN forces gathered around 50 small boats at Abu Musa Island. Once 
gathered, the two attacks were made using less than five boats each time. When U.S. forces 
sunk a Boghammer with relative ease, the spare small boats remained pier side.234 Naval 
exercises are executed to demonstrate IRGCN swarming tactics, but little evidence has 
been shown to determine if Iran can use such attacks effectively in an actual conflict. 
Disadvantages of swarming tactics limit their potential effectiveness against 
perceived U.S. aggression in the region. Despite efforts to reorganize the naval forces, the 
IRGCN has not faced a test of their command-and-control system since the Tanker War. 
During that conflict, when attacks began all forms of communication were abandoned 
which allowed the U.S. conventional force to isolate and destroy incoming threats with 
ease. In their routine patrols, the IRGCN is rarely caught operating in groups larger than 
three to five vessels.235 The ability to deploy swarms of hundreds of vessels successfully 
seems doubtful. Effective swarming continues to depend upon high levels of 
communication and the flow of information. Without information passing between 
networked units, swarming tactics cannot effectively or efficiently target enemy 
warships.236 Additionally, small boats must have perfect sea conditions and close 
operating ranges to be effective. High sea states or distances far from shore prevent small 
boats from effectively deploying their weapons.237 When small boats are in weapons range 
of their target, accuracy is yet another obstacle to overcome. Ship instability makes it 
difficult for a small boat to hit any target aside from a large and slow-moving oil tanker. 
Finally, U.S. Special Warfare sailors are better equipped and trained than their IRGCN 
counterparts.238 Although significant time and resources would need to be allocated in 
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transporting U.S. expeditionary forces to the Persian Gulf, once they are in the region, they 
can effectively respond to Iran in additional ways. During the Tanker War floating barge 
bases stationed off Farsi Island allowed rapid deployment of patrol craft and helicopters to 
counter IRGCN small boats attempting to disrupt U.S.-led convoys through the Persian 
Gulf. Swarming tactics remain a consideration for the U.S. Navy, however, Iran must 
depend on its full array of tactics to threaten their adversaries more credibly. 
D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
The use of media and strategic messaging further the IRGCN’s goal of deterrence 
in the Persian Gulf. Mass coverage of military exercises attempt to portray Iranian military 
capability in an elevated manner. The effort is an attempt to convince domestic audiences 
in the strength of the regime’s hold on power and international audiences in the likely 
severe cost that outright conflict with Iran would inflict.239 In addition to military 
exercises, political rhetoric and aggressive harassment of U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf 
are publicized to further the same messages.240 Overly ambitious military claims are made 
to exaggerate capabilities, including the IRGCN’s announcements about building their own 
aircraft carriers.241 When the IRGC is unable to push favorable news and media coverage 
for public consumption, more hard-lined approaches of censorship are utilized. The IRGC 
frequently monitors the use of internet communications to intercept and silence foreign 
ideals or messaging that challenges the authority of the regime.242 At times of heightened 
tension between Iran and the United States, the IRGCN is known to conduct series of naval 
exercises to flex its maritime capability.243 The most popular naval exercise is Noble 
Prophet. During a recent rendition of the exercise, IRGCN forces sunk a mock-up aircraft 
carrier to display Iran’s supposed ability to counter U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf. 
Military exercises or drills are typically conducted with no warning which increase the 
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sensational effect of the event and consciously undermine safety of navigation.244 These 
events are almost certain to follow enactment of new U.S. policies that attempt to weaken 
the regime. Iran wants to illustrate their resolve and persistence in presenting territorial 
defense. 
E. PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE MARITIME DOMAIN 
The IRIN, as it operates today, is primarily used to facilitate partnerships of interest 
to the regime. Deployments and naval exercises with countries such as Russia and China 
attempt to solidify the relationship that Iran has with them. This general “Turn to the East” 
is an attempt by Iran to navigate the sanctions and demanding economic situation that the 
United States has unilaterally placed them in. Despite a national security strategy that has 
emphasized self-reliance, Iran has become flexible in the face of dire circumstances. The 
lack of available options has pressured the Iranian regime to accept transactional 
relationships with outside powers that would have otherwise never happened.245  These 
relationships, by all parties involved, began as purely transactional. Shared appreciation 
for culture or genuine desire to build friendships are not the foundational elements. 
However, the transactional nature of these relationships has evolved. Signed agreements 
that cement relationships for decades into the future demonstrates Iran’s commitment to 
the East. Expanding Russian and Chinese influence in the Persian Gulf, by way of Iran’s 
flexible national security strategy, opens new potential threats to the United States. Access 
to ports, such as Bandar Abbas, means that Russian and Chinese warships that present more 
comparable conventional threats to the United States will have the option to patrol the 
Persian Gulf. In tandem with Iran’s asymmetric naval threat, the challenge could be 
difficult for the United States to overcome alone. Furthermore, if Iran could secure stronger 
relations with Russia and China, it could mean greater access to naval technology and 
shipyards. This would improve Iran’s own shipbuilding infrastructure and be a long-term 
pay-off in modernizing their own fleet. With Russia and China as collaborators against 
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U.S. global dominance, Iran aspires to have a powerful position in a new world order.246 
By aligning itself favorably with Russia and China, Iran believes it can strengthen its 
position in the international community and secure national defense. 
1. Russia 
Iran and Russia, in addition to being proponents of the Assad regime in Syria, have 
common interests in the Caspian Sea and Caucasus region.247 The Caspian Sea is host to 
large oil and gas reserves, however, waterborne access is only possible through Russia’s 
Volga-Don and Volga-Baltic waterways.248 The depth of the Iranian side of the Caspian 
Sea makes oil and gas exploration difficult. Expansion of Iranian economic activity in this 
region will require additional investment. The strategic relationship between Russia and 
Iran has developed amidst the growing tension with the United States.249 Both are 
interested in challenging U.S. interests around the globe. An Iranian relationship with the 
Russian Navy would significantly enhance Russia’s ability to rotate its fleet from the 
Pacific into the Mediterranean. Access to Iranian port facilities at Bandar Abbas would 
allow Russian ships to rest, refuel, and replenish supplies in support of global 
operations.250 Furthermore, a closer relationship with Russia means that Iran has easier 
access to purchasing weapons technology than it has in the recent past. The U.S. Navy 
would have to make difficult decisions deploying carrier strike groups to the Persian Gulf 
if Iran had greater access to Russian long-range, supersonic ASMs.251 Russia and Iran 
have agreed to conduct regular naval exercises in the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Strait 
of Hormuz. Alarming as this is for the United States, Russia has not yet utilized Iranian 
naval bases offered to them in support of deployments. Russian warships utilizing facilities 
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at Chabahar, Bandar Abbas, and Bender-Busher would expand its ability to project 
influence within the Persian Gulf and beyond.252 Whether Russian warships acted 
independently or in coordination with IRGCN small boats, the addition of regularly 
deploying Russian warships to the region add an additional threat that U.S. Navy carrier 
strike groups would have to consider prior to entering the Persian Gulf. 
2. China 
IRIN deployments to China seek to expand Iran’s relationship built on economic 
investment into the country. China has exported military equipment and key technologies 
that remain the cornerstone of Iran’s military defense industry.253 Nearly all of Iranian 
ASM capability is of Chinese design. Since 2000, China has sold Iran 930 ASMs, 1,750 
portable surface-to-air missiles, six surface-to-air missile systems, three air search radars, 
and nine catamaran missile boats.254 China remains the single largest importer of Iranian 
oil and has often served as a political voice for Iran at the United Nations and Security 
Council.255 By serving as a roadblock for the international community’s decisions 
concerning Iran, China uses Iran as leverage against U.S. global influence. Chinese 
investment was also critical to the development of naval base facilities at Chabahar, Bandar 
Abbas, and Bender-Busher.256 When China conducts naval exercises with Iran, as it had 
in 2017 and 2019, China was careful to conduct similar drills with Saudi Arabia.257 China 
has committed itself equally to Iraq, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and 
Turkey as much as it has to Iran.258 Iran’s economic potential has significant restraints that 
cause China to look elsewhere in the region for investment. The Iranian domestic market 
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remains underdeveloped, U.S. sanctions make business difficult, and regional tensions 
make Chinese investors pause.259 Despite these obstacles, China remains watchful for 
economic opportunities in the region and is willing to negotiate advantageous agreements 
with Iran to extend its own global influence. 
China’s interest in the Persian Gulf is tied to the long-term commercial benefits of 
the region. While dialogue with Iran is a critical component to their strategy, the Chinese 
balance their relations with Iran against many other nations in the Middle East.260 New 
deals struck between China and Iran demonstrate China’s political acumen and sense of 
Iran’s weak position among the international community. Iran’s need for extensive 
investment led Iran to accept deals that were optimal for Chinese companies in the long-
term.261 China is careful to not antagonize or choose sides in regional conflicts and will 
not be willing to deploy soldiers in Iran. Maintaining a balanced relationship with Iran is 
important for China’s economic vision.262 China will continue to assist Iran in limited 
ways while remaining politically unattached to issues specific to the region. China has no 
willingness to be dragged into armed conflict with Iran and its regional rivals. However, 
Iran holds value in challenging U.S. global hegemony. Iranian activity that challenges U.S. 
interests in the Persian Gulf, even if limited, detract the United States from other possible 
commitments across the world. In global competition with the United States, China is 
willing to economically assist Iran if they can cause regional instability and harm U.S. 
interests in the Middle East.263 Iran is aware that its relationship with China was not agreed 
upon with the most advantageous terms. Tougher trade terms that limit Iranian economic 
growth will not likely set the stage for a lasting friendship.264 However, with lack of 
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options available to Iran and an interest in challenging U.S. interests in the Middle East, 
Iran will continue to turn East in the immediate future. 
F. INTERACTIONS AT SEA 
Analysis of interactions at sea between vessels and the IRGCN help understand 
how Iran’s security strategy is realized in the maritime domain. Central to United States 
and other Western partners is freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. IRGCN activity 
in the region indicates its willingness to challenge the presence of other vessels, both 
military and civilian. The IRGCN is viewed, by the U.S. Navy, as the less professional 
naval force of Iran. Radio communications with FIAC can be challenging to coordinate 
and, even when established, IRGCN units are often unwilling to cooperate with U.S. 
requests. Without proper communication between the IRGCN and other vessels operating 
in the Persian Gulf, opportunities for miscalculation arise.265 Depending on the political 
environment and state of relations between Iran and the U.S., IRGCN activities could be 
deemed hostile by U.S. Navy leadership. Unsafe and unprofessional interactions could lead 
the U.S. Navy to act in self-defense. On the other side, IRGCN units could misunderstand 
an order and unnecessarily press the level of aggression in its interactions with maritime 
traffic. Therefore, to understand Iran’s approach to the maritime domain, further 
investigation as to how asymmetric naval assets are used on a regular basis is necessary. 
In doing so, the United States can understand patterns of behavior and how far Iran is 
willing to push its sea denial and deterrence strategy. 
1. IRGCN Captures U.S. Sailors near Farsi Island  
The humiliating incident of two U.S. riverine boats being seized along with ten U.S. 
sailors into the custody of the IRGCN posed a scenario that could have easily led to 
escalation. On the night of January 12, 2016, two riverine boats were underway in route 
from Kuwait to Bahrain when a series of issues arose.266 First, the ranking officer claimed 
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that failure of navigation equipment led the vessels off course in their transit of the Persian 
Gulf. Secondly, the vessels were beginning to run low on fuel for their journey back to 
base. When IRGCN vessels noticed the U.S. riverine boats entering territorial waters near 
Farsi Island, IRGCN vessels began to make their approach. The U.S. vessels attempted to 
increase speed, exit territorial waters, and proceed out of range of the IRGCN. However, 
when one of the vessels incurred an engineering casualty, the crews and crafts were seized 
shortly after. Adding to the riverine boats’ difficulties, radio communication with 5th 
Fleet’s command center had been lost and left military leadership unaware of the unfolding 
details. The IRGCN held the U.S. sailors in custody for approximately 16 hours before 
their release. While in IRGCN hands, the sailors were fed, given blankets, and eventually 
allowed to sail back to a U.S. warship awaiting their release. During their time in IRGCN 
custody, video was taken showing the Americans kneeling with hands behind their heads. 
Another video showed the ranking officer apologizing profusely for their navigational 
errors causing the scenario to unfold. Other images of American sailors with tears in their 
eyes were used by the IRGCN to harm U.S. prestige.267 Many government officials at the 
time attributed the ability to negotiate the release of the U.S. sailors to the ongoing 
discussions over the nuclear deal. Secretary of State John Kerry had a planned phone call 
with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif before the incident had even 
occurred.268 Without the improved lines of communication, perhaps negotiating the U.S. 
sailors’ release would have been more difficult. 
In 2007, fifteen British sailors were taken into Iranian custody following an 
inspection of a merchant ship based on the claim that the vessel had entered territorial 
waters. The British sailors were in Iranian custody for 13 days before finally released. This 
stands in contradiction to U.S. sailors who were in custody for less than 24 hours. In part, 
this could be attributed to the ongoing talks between the United States and Iran related to 
the nuclear deal. The increased communication, which had not been seen for years, resulted 
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in a deal much faster than could otherwise be considered. However, the IRGCN likely acted 
in a restrained manner due to the chance that escalating the situation any further would 
have had drastic consequences. First, economic relief associated with the nuclear deal 
could have been in jeopardy. More importantly, aggressive or hostile action against U.S. 
Navy sailors could legitimize conflict for which Iran is ill-prepared. Rather than chance an 
escalation of force, Iran used the opportunity for propaganda. Videos showcased Iran’s 
ability to patrol and defend their waters.269 Furthermore, the videos were embarrassing 
images for the United States to see and caused some to question the course of operations 
being taken in the Persian Gulf. The event demonstrated how volatile the environment can 
be in the Persian Gulf and how unexpected events can develop into potentially catastrophic 
international incidents.270 At the same time, restraint by IRGCN forces showed their 
understanding of the political situation. Hostile action against U.S. Navy riverine boats or 
poor treatment of U.S. Navy sailors while in IRGCN custody could have set the stage for 
a conventional military response.  
2. Stena Impero 
While transiting the Strait of Hormuz, British tanker Stena Impero was detained by 
IRGCN forces on July 19, 2019. Iran accused Stena Impero of colliding with a fishing boat 
and failing to answer calls, all accusations that the ship’s owner denies. A Royal Navy 
frigate was deployed to aid the Stena Impero as IRGCN forces approached, however, they 
did not arrive in time. Armed speedboats intercepted the tanker and Sepah Navy Special 
Forces (IRGCN’s expeditionary force) boarded the vessel via a Mi-171 helicopter.271 
IRGCN forces led the Stena Impero into Iranian territorial waters and to the port of Bandar 
Abbas. A total of 23 crew members were held in Iranian custody while the vessel remained 
at anchor and a court case was issued in Iran over the incident. The vessel remained 
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anchored in vicinity of Bandar Abbas until September 27, 2019.272 This incident likely 
occurred in response to a British seizure of an Iranian tanker in vicinity of Gibraltar by the 
UK Royal Marines. Iranian tanker Adrian Darya-1 was seized on suspicion of violating 
European Union sanctions against Syria. The United States supported the action, 
threatening to impose sanctions on any buyer of the 2.1 million barrels of oil being carried 
onboard the Iranian tanker. 
This incident occurred among a series of escalating IRGCN attacks on Saudi 
Arabian oil platforms as well as other foreign maritime traffic in the region. Iranian 
aggressiveness was linked in part to President Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action and following rhetoric against the Islamic Republic. 
IRGCN response to perceived attacks on the regime are meant to be a show of force. When 
a response to Iranian aggression is given, the IRGCN will typically cease harassing activity 
for some time. Without a response, IRGCN forces are emboldened to press the level of 
aggression and see how far they can take their behavior. 
G. CONCLUSION 
IRGCN naval doctrine, in more recent times, largely remains untested. Simulating 
widespread training events that would mimic a counteroffensive against U.S. conventional 
naval forces is difficult. Nevertheless, the West has grown to recognize the potential of the 
IRGCN’s asymmetric strategy and have been incorporating training of their own to combat 
the threat. Political tensions between the United States and Iran provide a unique maritime 
atmosphere for naval forces to operate in. A minor skirmish between a U.S. warship and 
an overzealous IRGCN small boat could escalate into an unintended regional conflict. Iran 
continues to implement sea denial and deterrence-based strategies to limit the presence of 
the U.S. Navy in the region. Using geography to its advantage, Iran spreads its asymmetric 
naval threat across its vast coastline, islands, and offshore structures. Together, swarming 
vessels and shore-based weapons systems seek to saturate and overwhelm modern 
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conventional sea power. Iran continues to explore transactional partnerships with states 
wanting to challenge U.S. global influence. Expanding economic relief, weapons 
procurement, and naval coordination with Russia and China add a dynamic component to 
Iran’s own asymmetric naval threat. While interactions with the IRGCN at sea challenge 
international norms, Iran remains calculated in its approach to the maritime domain. Iran 
will continue to test the boundaries of U.S. presence in the region, but remain outside of 
any action that would clearly warrant an overt military response. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
This thesis examined Iran’s challenge to U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf. 
Iranian asymmetric naval warfare seeks to deter U.S. conventional sea power through a 
myriad of threats distributed across Iran’s extensive coastline and other strategic positions 
near the Strait of Hormuz. By increasing political costs and risk to operations, Iran believes 
it can create an intolerable price for the United States to sustain presence in the region. The 
introductory chapter proposed three hypotheses concerning Iran’s approach to the maritime 
domain. This chapter will revisit each hypothesis and discuss whether they reflect Iran’s 
current condition. The first hypothesis stated that Iran enhanced its naval capability in 
response to past failures during the Tanker War. As a result, Iran’s asymmetric naval threat 
sufficiently challenges U.S. conventional sea power and Iran can reliably achieve national 
defense objectives in the Persian Gulf. The second hypothesis stated that Iran’s 
improvements in asymmetric naval warfare fall short of legitimately challenging U.S. 
operations in the maritime domain. Therefore, conventional sea power persists in 
countering Iran’s unconventional approach and inhibits the state’s ability to secure national 
defense. The third hypothesis stated that Iran will never meet security objectives within the 
maritime domain until it can procure a conventional naval force comparable to the United 
States. The following analysis will discuss the suitability or shortfalls of each hypothesis. 
Research conducted for this thesis largely affirms the first hypothesis. Today’s 
geopolitical environment grants additional space for Iran to exercise coercive capabilities 
and counteract U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf.273 Political barriers to U.S. action allow 
Iran space within the gray zone to leverage its asymmetric naval threats. IRGCN actions 
against civilian vessels have seemingly violated redlines without a firm response. Iran’s 
increased use of swarming small boats, limpet mines, and boardings against civilian vessels 
indicates an unwillingness of the United States and GCC partners to escalate tensions 
further. Iran will likely continue to conduct similar actions in the future to determine how 
much influence the IRGCN can exert unopposed in the maritime domain. Although it is 
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unlikely the U.S. Navy will completely abstain from operating in the Persian Gulf, the 
evolution of Iran’s asymmetric naval threats causes the U.S. Navy to carefully consider 
movements. Recent U.S. hesitation to deploy carrier strike groups into the region further 
supports the notion that Iran’s asymmetric naval threat provides a level of deterrence.274 
The United States will not pursue military operations in the Persian Gulf that unnecessarily 
place high-value units at risk.  
The prospect of prolonged conflict in the Middle East adds to U.S. reluctance to 
commit resources to the region and provides Iran with additional leverage in the maritime 
domain. Operating in the Persian Gulf for extended periods of time is a costly endeavor for 
the U.S. Navy. Even with GCC and Western partners supporting U.S. naval operations, 
deploying large contingencies of surface vessels to the region is a major investment that 
could be used elsewhere. The rise of great power competition challenges the United States 
as a leader of the international community and its prioritization of resources across the 
globe. Assets that the United States commits to the Middle East must be viewed within the 
scope of rising competition with other states. Specifically, Russian and Chinese interests 
in challenging U.S. hegemony and creating a multipolar international system coincides 
with Iranian interests. Iran’s naval force cannot defeat the U.S. Navy in symmetrical 
combat. However, Iran can raise the cost of operating in the Persian Gulf and make U.S. 
politicians question their investment to the region. Enticing a U.S. withdrawal from the 
region meets Iran’s primary goal within the maritime domain. Any reduction of U.S. 
commitment to the Persian Gulf will allow the IRGCN to solidify regional interests and 
open possibilities for Iranian maritime influence beyond the Strait of Hormuz. 
Revolutionary fervor alone cannot overcome superior weaponry. Technological 
advancements have improved Iran’s asymmetric naval threat and serve as a reasonable 
deterrent to widespread U.S. naval operations in the region. Reorganization of command-
and-control structures, development of advanced coastal cruise missiles, and procurement 
of hundreds, possibly thousands, of additional small boats reinforce Iran’s commitment to 
coastal defense. FIAC, ASMs, and sea mines are central to the Iranian asymmetric naval 
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threat. Modern upgrades have enabled Iran’s domestic defense industry to develop smaller, 
faster, and cheaper small boats that can carry munitions for a variety of missions. The 
prospect of Iran adding unmanned vessels as suicide boats to their arsenal represents a 
continuing evolution of the surface naval threat Iran can pose. ASMs remain a critical 
component to Iran’s deterrence strategy. As weapons systems achieve longer ranges and 
improved accuracy, Iran can threaten shipping from coastline defenses with increased 
credibility. The expansion of ports and shore-based ASM sites across the Persian Gulf 
distribute Iran’s asymmetric naval threat and decrease the impact of possible U.S. 
retaliatory strikes. The destruction of a single port or launch site does not drastically reduce 
Iranian defense capability. Lastly, sea mines continue to pose a low-cost, high-impact 
solution to potential escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf remains 
critically important to the health of the global economy. Safe and reliable passage through 
the Strait of Hormuz brings stability to the world energy market. The combination of Iran’s 
asymmetric naval threats can credibly threaten economic stability and deter U.S. Navy 
operations in the region. 
The second hypothesis understates Iran’s asymmetric naval threat and willingness 
to engage U.S. military forces. While research confirms that Iran is aware of their inability 
to defeat the United States in a symmetric confrontation, Iran does maintain a valid network 
of defense systems that can harm U.S. naval forces operating in the region. Iran’s ability 
to enact weapons saturation doctrine and overwhelm adversaries has steadily improved 
over the decades. Iranian retaliatory missile strikes on Ayn Al Asad base in Iraq in January 
2020 is one of many cases that indicate Iran’s commitment to military action when 
pressured to act.275 IRGCN harassment of U.S. Navy vessels on April 15, 2020 also 
demonstrate a willingness to test U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf. During this event, 11 
IRGCN small boats conducted dangerously close maneuvers to U.S. Navy warships.276 
The boldness of IRGCN units to act remains and their capability to coordinate larger groups 
of small boats seems to indicate an improvement in command-and-control. Iran’s approach 
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to the maritime domain does not seek outright conflict with the U.S. Navy. IRGCN efforts 
aim to raise the costs of sustained U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf and, hopefully, grant 
Iran opportunities to pursue regional ambitions unopposed. The absence of U.S. naval 
forces also begins to open possibilities for Iran to pursue maritime interests beyond the 
Persian Gulf. To assess Iran’s naval force effectiveness in achieving national security goals 
it is important to look beyond the advantages that U.S. naval power has over asymmetric 
naval threats within the narrow definition of war.  
Conventional sea power is not a requirement to meet deterrence-based or defense-
oriented security goals. This finding refutes the third hypothesis. Prior to the Islamic 
Revolution, Iran was well-positioned to develop a conventional naval force with the 
support of the West. However, U.S. partnership and defense industry support vanished 
once the Shah of Iran was overthrown and the Islamic Republic was established. The abrupt 
regime change had massive implications for how Iran was perceived in the world and how 
Iran chose to pursue foreign policy. Once relations with the United States was broken, Iran 
was not able to support a conventional naval force. Aiming to deter Western interference 
in regional affairs, Iran took new strategic approaches to maintain some level of influence 
within the maritime domain. The adoption of asymmetric naval warfare was a decision 
made of necessity and a lack of alternative options. Today, the IRIN operates a small 
contingency of conventional naval forces. These vessels are either direct remnants from 
the IIN or are moderately improved versions of the Shah’s navy. This grants the IRIN 
limited opportunities to pursue blue-water interests, conduct naval exercises with partners, 
and test new oceangoing platforms. The IRGCN has also proclaimed interests in acquiring 
larger, more capable assets for future operations. However, financing and domestically 
constructing a conventional naval force is a massive undertaking for Iran. These ambitious 
plans will take decades to realize under a self-reliance strategic approach. While 
relationships with Russia and China could expedite the development of blue-water 
capability and influence, Iran does not place conventional sea power as a requirement to 
pursue interests in the maritime domain. 
The IRGCN remains Iran’s preferred naval organization due to its experience with 
asymmetric naval threats. Since its founding in 1985, the IRGCN has steadily outpaced its 
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rival organization, the IRIN, for resources and prestige. While the IRIN remains in 
operation, until a larger contingent of conventional naval power is attainable the 
organization will remain in a subservient role. Long-range deployments indicate an Iranian 
interest to pursue influence within the maritime domain beyond its coastal waters. 
However, the immediate focus of Iran remains fixated on securing regional position. 
Although restricted to sea denial strategies, Iran has progressively developed its domestic 
defense industry capability and attempts to maximize production of various asymmetric 
naval threats. Iran’s goal is not to sink all U.S. warships in the region, it is simply to compel 
a withdrawal and end U.S. interference in Middle Eastern affairs. Since Iran does not have 
a maritime strategy that seeks to decisively defeat U.S. naval forces in combat, 
conventional naval power is not a requirement to meet more limited deterrence-based and 
defense-oriented goals. The small number of conventional IRIN units are significant 
enough to project influence against Gulf state rivals. Meanwhile, the IRGCN can focus its 
resources on cost-effective asymmetric naval threats to combat U.S. Navy presence in the 
Persian Gulf. Technological advancements continue to narrow the gap and allow sea denial 
strategies to become increasingly effective.  
Iran will continue to use sea denial strategies within the maritime domain. Sea 
control is not currently within Iranian capability. Geography alone gives Iran significant 
advantages over staging its asymmetric naval threats and overcoming the critical 
operational factor of space. Short distances allow surface vessels to respond to threats 
quicker, ASMs to reach most of the crowded shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz, and 
sea mines to halt lanes of maritime traffic. Despite Iran’s inability to credibly display its 
proficiency in carrying out the command-and-control requirement for successful swarming 
tactics, the prevalence of small boats being added to its inventory demonstrate an upgraded 
capability from the last surface engagement with the United States. Partnerships with 
Russia and China present an intriguing challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East. Iran’s 
desperation for economic relief and assistance with developing military capability has led 
the regime to entertain slight deviations from a self-reliant national security approach. 
Although Iran is unlikely to make any lasting alliances with these larger powers, the 
relationships for the short-term are mutually beneficial. Russia and China can use the 
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maritime domain to spread its level of influence in the Persian Gulf and secure their own 
economic interests for future growth. Iran can leverage its own asymmetric naval threats 
with the addition of foreign conventional warships operating in or near the Persian Gulf. 
Alone, the addition of Russian and Chinese warships operating in the region would present 
a significant challenge to U.S. interests. If these powers are willing to coordinate to an even 
greater degree, Iran could more credibly threaten U.S. presence in the region. The trade-
off that Iran makes to remove U.S. influence are the attachments to Russian and Chinese 
demands. Deepening commitments to Russia or China to help deter the threat of the United 
States still erodes the independence that Iran seeks to act with. 
International initiatives, such as the International Maritime Security Construct, 
could remove the burden of U.S. carrier strike groups from operating in the Persian Gulf 
without abandoning all U.S. interests. U.S. development of newer surface platforms are 
also likely to change the U.S. Navy’s strategic approach in the long-term. The addition of 
new classes of frigates and other smaller surface combatants that are equipped with FIAC 
and ASM self-defense capabilities could relieve the rotation of carrier strike groups and 
allow smaller surface action groups to fill in for U.S. interests more manageably. The 
United States must continue to be aware that any decision to downsize U.S. naval 
commitment to the Persian Gulf will send a clear message to Iran. With the United States 
absent from the maritime domain, Iran has greater opportunity to undermine international 
law, harass civilian shipping, and pursue hegemonic ambitions.277 Iran poses a credible 
challenge to the United States within the maritime domain. Decades of adherence to 
asymmetric naval warfare has given Iran time to improve upon strategic approaches. 
Technological advances continue to narrow the gap between conventional sea power and 
unconventional tactics. The modern sociopolitical environment adds additional obstacles 
for the United States to navigate and allows Iran opportunity to challenge U.S. interests in 
the Persian Gulf. 
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